The July 2024 uprising in Bangladesh marked a pivotal moment as students and citizens rallied for transformative change, challenging established political hierarchies. Unlike previous movements, this protest operated independently of any political party leadership, underscoring a grassroots demand for reform that had eluded mainstream opposition efforts for over a decade. For the first time, a mass uprising forced the removal of a seemingly entrenched regime through sheer public resolve, demonstrating the often-overlooked power of collective action—an "event" as described by eminent French philosopher Alain Badiou: a disruptive break from the status quo of conventional political order.

On August 8, the formation of an interim government emerged as a critical turning point in Bangladesh's political landscape, briefly uniting opposition forces, including the BNP, around a shared agenda for paradigmatic change. Initially supportive of the student movement, some argue that the BNP later tempered its endorsement, seemingly distancing itself strategically from some of the demands for structural reform of extractive institutions widely seen as enabling the rise of illiberal, authoritarian governance, epitomised by the recently ousted regime. Notably, the BNP is now subtly yet unmistakably shifting away from calls for the immediate resignation of the sitting president—a figure closely tied to the discredited past—and towards advocating for a more cautious, electoral roadmap. This strategic repositioning has allowed the BNP to present itself as a stabilising force focused on continuity and gradual reform through electoral processes, a choice that critics argue reflects a conservative impulse to preserve familiar structures.

According to cultural theorist Frederic Jameson, understanding such political decisions requires analysis through multiple lenses or "horizons." On the "political horizon," Jameson's first level of analysis, the BNP's reluctance to support student-led calls for immediate presidential removal can be viewed as a tactical move to balance reform aspirations with stability. By prioritising an electoral roadmap over sudden upheaval, the BNP is perhaps portraying itself as a seasoned opposition force. This approach positions the party as a measured alternative amid calls for radical change—a strategic choice to avoid being swept up in what it might see as "instant gratification" in favour of long-term goals. However, critics argue that this approach risks the party appearing overly conservative and misaligned with the youth-driven energy fuelling the July uprising.

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The "social horizon," meanwhile, explores deeper class and institutional interests that shape political choices, often unconsciously. Here, the BNP's distance from grassroots reform demands can be seen as aligning with the entrenched two-party system, which has long structured politics in Bangladesh. By prioritising incremental reforms and institutional stability over radical transformation, BNP implicitly supports structures that have historically benefited both itself and the Awami League. This reluctance to disrupt institutional power structures could be understood through Jameson's concept of the "political unconscious," where underlying class interests influence behaviour that may appear pragmatic but, in effect, serves to protect established hierarchies. The BNP's stance could be reflective of this tendency, preserving a status quo that risks sidelining the radical reforms that some segments of the public are increasingly demanding.

In the "historical horizon," Jameson's final layer of interpretation, BNP's response to the uprising can be seen as part of Bangladesh's cyclical political struggles. Rather than embracing a transformative shift, BNP's positioning could suggest a reluctance to break from long-standing political rivalries, framing itself as the ideological heir to the student movement's anti-Awami League sentiment while resisting a deep engagement with systemic overhaul. But this positioning could risk reducing the uprising's transformative vision to another episode in the Awami League-BNP rivalry. In Jameson's view, such cyclical politics underscore a missed opportunity for genuine change, as BNP's actions could hint at continuity within Bangladesh's familiar political pattern to some, rather than a break from it.

French philosopher Alain Badiou's concept of the "moment" underscores the unique potential of the July 2024 uprising to introduce new political realities. For Badiou, such a moment represents a radical rupture from established norms, challenging entrenched power structures and creating the possibility of unforeseen political reforms. The uprising's mass mobilisation of public sentiment without major party backing exemplifies that this kind of "event" informed disruptive rupture, a grassroots force demanding structural change that bypasses established political channels.

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However, Badiou also warns that these transformative moments can be co-opted or neutralised if not sustained by active revolutionary commitment, or what he calls "fidelity" to the event. The BNP's stance, which shifted from initially aligning with the students to later portraying the president as a stabilising figure, could risk dissipating the transformative potential of this "moment." By reverting to conventional political processes, BNP's approach could undermine the movement's radical energy, restoring the status quo ante, rather than actualising the profound systemic reforms demanded by some people.

Ultimately, the BNP's decision to prioritise stability over radical change illustrates a complex dilemma: straddling the aftermath of a revolutionary "event" and realpolitik. While the party's cautious stance may preserve order and avoid immediate risks, it also places the BNP at odds with some segments of society that have become increasingly disillusioned by traditional politics. This hesitance could alienate reform-minded citizens, especially younger voters who may view BNP's position as self-serving or evasive. Rather than merely adopting the movement's ideological legacy, BNP's strategic ambivalence risks positioning it as another entity within the political duopoly that the uprising implicitly critiques.

BNP's strategic choices in the wake of the July uprising reveal a tension between preserving continuity and embracing transformative potential. While Jameson's "Three Horizons" show how the party's stance aligns with established power structures, Badiou's concept of the "moment" underscores the revolutionary potential that the BNP risks missing. By aligning itself too closely with stability, and gradualism, BNP could marginalise itself in the eyes of a public yearning for meaningful change. To truly capture the movement's spirit, the party may need to move beyond mere strategic positioning and fully engage with the grassroots demands that fuelled the July uprising—demands that traditional, incremental politics can no longer afford to overlook. By the same token, this challenge also calls for a delicate balancing act of realpolitik, as the party weighs transformative ambitions against the pressures of political continuity and stability in an unpredictable landscape.

Dr Faridul Alam writes from New York City, US.

Views expressed in this article are the author's own.

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August 5 was a historic day for Bangladesh for more reasons than one. The Awami League (AL), the party whose cause was a cornerstone in Bangladesh's history, was ousted by the masses.

Since independence, political turmoil has been part of narratives closely related to Bangladesh. One of the factors which worked in the AL's favour, from the time the party assumed responsibility in 2009, was that it was regarded as the most progressive and liberal party to have gained power following liberation. At that point in time, AL's values struck a chord with the secular middle-class Bangladeshi. The preceding regimes association with elements such as the military, fundamentalism, and state-centric politics aided in this regard.

Fast forward to 2024, and one finds that the AL-led 14-party alliance's rule is being labelled "fascist."

The AL regime has been somewhat of a conundrum. The Perspective Plan of Bangladesh 2041 (PP 2041), which was published in 2020, envisioned to build on economic advancements and enhance the lives of people. The AL accommodated more public-private partnerships within the media world than any other party before and oversaw the widespread introductions of leading social media websites such as Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram. Indeed, the regime looked outwards and allowed creative media productions to be released, which did not always comply with the more conservative National Broadcast Policy of 2014. Accordingly, the party is largely responsible for digitalising a new generation of Bangladeshis, many of whom have smartphones and global aspirations today and took to the streets during the recent protests. Student coordinators such as Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud are surely part of that generation and are, in fact, products of "Digital Bangladesh."

"Digital Bangladesh" was a pillar that supported the party's return to the centre in 2009 and represented its defiance of right-wing politics. AL's reformist approaches resonated with the masses in the context of globalisation and the interrelatedness of international networks in the 21st century. Their alliance with left-wing parties enabled the AL to stay in power and inspire many in the country. But, as it has transpired, the 14-party alliance seems to have paved the way for more dreams than stairs to reach those ambitions.

The recent movement portrayed the angst and frustration of the people from various sectors in Bangladesh, including journalism. The protests that began in the first week of July should be credited for capturing on-the-ground reactions. The mass killings, detentions, disappearances and violence against unarmed protestors that took place during this movement truly called into question the ethos of AL's political mandate. Over 400 people have lost their lives during the quota reform movement between July 16 and August 4, with some claiming that the number may well be understated. It has also been put forward that hospital records have been tampered with and bodies hidden, further putting into question just how many people have sacrificed their lives to bring an end to AL's rule.

Students have always been integral to the political narrative of Bangladesh. The fall of the Ershad regime was not brought about only by workers, but students as well, who endeavoured to take the nation forward on the path of democracy. Students again played their part in 2008 and 2013, when the Shahbagh Protests signalled their support for secular and not communal politics. In 2024, students took a stance once against the fascist practices of the Awami regime.

The tragic reality is that the AL committed to preserving democracy in the country, but backed the said promise by fascist means. The quota reform movement, which eventually led to the AL government's end, stemmed from opposition to fascist practices which often granted AL supporters, activists, and leaders the license to terrorise communities around the country. Throughout its rule, the former ruling party publicly branded opposition parties, such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and its allies as being fundamentalist and in conflict with the progressive agenda of the party.

While AL's statement may well be true when considering the realities of grassroots politics and the history of BNP and its allies, the Awami League's ideology also correlated with its globalist persuasions. The AL attained success in this sphere and was able to, for a period since 2009, be the flagbearer of the identity of the modern Bangladeshi. But, at present the premise of AL is being questioned and it remains to be seen how that plays out.

In essence, what the masses including the youths of Bangladesh have conveyed through this movement is that they are averse to right-wing politics in general, and both AL and BNP are considered part of that category today. This is very important to consider as we eventually transition to political-administrative rule again. Only time will tell whether progressive politics really do see the light of day in Bangladesh and who will be the leading stakeholders of the future. Meanwhile, the appointment of Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus as the chief of the interim government seems to be a step in the right direction.        

Nihad Nowsher works in business development.

Views expressed in this article are the author's own.

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The history of Awami League (AL)—which started off as the Awami Muslim League (AML)—at 75 can be encapsulated under three headings: AL at birth; AL under Bangabandhu's leadership; and AL with Sheikh Hasina at the helm. From the time of its birth in 1949 to our liberation in 1971, AL can be credited with being either the author of or the main mover and participant in all democratic and cultural movements working tirelessly to strengthen the demand for the rights of the Bangalees in East Pakistan. No other party can claim to have singularly represented all our democratic aspirations as the Awami League during our days under Pakistan.

In the first phase, the two most important events that brought the AML to the forefront was first, the Language Movement, which united the people of East Pakistan and crystallised the efforts of AML to become the true voice of the people, and second, the 1954 provincial election under the banner of United Front (Jukta Front), in which AML was by far the biggest and most active partner, getting 143 seats as the party and 228 seats as part of the Jukta Front out of a total of 309 seats. These events marked AML's coming of age.

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The 1954 election proved that there was a far deeper significance of AML's birth than many people realised then and even now. It has not been studied in depth, and its significance has not been fully evaluated in subsequent research and books that have been published since. It was the beginning of the disillusionment with the ideology of Pakistan; it was the start of questioning as to whether religion could be the only foundation of a newly formed state; it presented evidence that people lost confidence in the founding party of Pakistan, the Muslim League, which never recovered later, except under the military tutelage.

Almost all the leaders who formed the new party were integral parts of the Pakistan movement, and some of them, like Shaheed Suhrawardy and Maulana Bhashani, were its front-ranking leaders. So, why after succeeding to carve out Pakistan, would these leaders and thousands of their followers move away from the party—the Muslim League—that founded the new country?

Awami League members in the cabinet of AK Fazlul Huq in East Bengal, 1954. FILE PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The answer is very simple. With Pakistan's birth, Muslim League suddenly revealed itself to be devoted to serve the interest of the feudal landed gentry from West Pakistan, especially that of Punjab. The so-called Pakistani leadership was not concerned with its multiple and varied linguistic and cultural heritage. Bangalees, who constituted the majority of the new country's population, found their economic rights and cultural heritage ignored and their language, Bangla, denied the status of being a state language. In fact, the death of the new country was signalled by the very man who founded it, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, when he declared in Dhaka, "Let there be no doubt that Urdu and Urdu shall be the only national language of Pakistan." That was the beginning of the end of Pakistan founded in 1947.

The victory in the 1970 general election, under Bangabandhu's leadership, was Awami League's biggest, most sweeping and politically critical achievement in that period. In many ways, it was the precursor to our Liberation War. That electoral victory gave AL the legal, moral and political right to speak on behalf of the people of East Pakistan, and declare independence and start the armed struggle when genocide was imposed on our unarmed people.

It was under Bangabandhu's stewardship that Awami League truly expanded its appeal to the masses and captured the imagination of the Bangalees. His was a dazzling phase—truly energising, deeply penetrating and fully capturing the attention, support and devotion of millions of ordinary people. His Six-Point Programme galvanised the people as never before and hardened their resolve to fight for their economic, cultural and political rights. Those of us, as student activists, who were witness to his meteoric rise, who had the privilege to hear his mesmerising speeches and marvelled at his courage in facing both the Pakistani elite and its formidable armed forces, and saw firsthand how he unified the Bangalees with his unmatched charisma, felt in our hearts that finally we had a leader who could realise the dream of our freedom and independence.

The victory in the 1970 general election, under Bangabandhu's leadership, was Awami League's biggest, most sweeping and politically critical achievement in that period. In many ways, it was the precursor to our Liberation War. That electoral victory gave AL the legal, moral and political right to speak on behalf of the people of East Pakistan, and declare independence and start the armed struggle when genocide was imposed on our unarmed people. AL's leadership, the role of the Mujibnagar government and especially that of war-time PM Tajuddin Ahmad were remarkable in every way. Though physically absent, Bangabandhu was present in every mukti joddha camp, and in the hearts and minds of everyone who fought for our independence.

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Bangabandhu's brutal killing, along with all members of his immediate family, save the two daughters—our current PM and her sister—was the most tragic event that could have befallen us, and from which we are yet to fully recover.

Of Awami League's 75 years of existence, the last 43 have been under Sheikh Hasina's leadership. Since her return from exile in India in 1981 till date, she rebuilt AL after it suffered from deep existential crises following the brutal murder of Bangabandhu. She has not only successfully re-organised and re-energised the party, but also brought it to power in 1996, after 21 years of being in the opposition. She returned to power in 2008 and has continued till date, well on her way to completing an unbroken spell of 20 years of heading our government.

During her last 15 years of unbroken rule, she brought about remarkable advancement in the country's economic field. Her spectacular success in infrastructure development and power generation, with the capacity cost aspect being seriously questioned, is highly laudable. Bangladesh's praiseworthy rise up the development ladder can definitely be attributed to Sheikh Hasina's able and determined running of the state's affairs.

Awami League members bring out a procession on June 21, 2024, on the occasion of the party's 75th anniversary. PHOTO: PALASH KHAN

However, her grand success came with some very damaging costs. As is evidenced in history, a party in opposition and the same party in power, especially when the stay is long, presents two radically different pictures. The Awami League that began as the voice of the people has now ended up being that of an individual. The more the party stayed in power, the more its operations became centralised. From the smallest to the most significant policy decisions, they are no longer the result of debates within its ranks, but personnel choices of the leadership. From local leaders to the central, from nominations to every single post in all the levels of the elected office, the leader's wish is everybody's command.

Today, it is one of the most centralised parties anywhere in the world with the inevitable consequence of rising authoritarian tendencies in all levels of the leadership structure. The micromanagement of the party has had the same consequences as it always does: of there being no delegation of authority, no accountability at any level, and no sense of ownership of what the party does, except to carry out orders from the top.

Elections, a crucial measure of judging how a political party is faring in the public eye, is no longer valid in Bangladesh. It has lost its fundamental ability to elect genuine representatives of the people, due to both the ruling party's grip on all state institutions that guarantee free polls and the opposition's unthinking boycott of elections. Making voters insignificant has been a hallmark of the last three general elections.

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As AL celebrates 75 years of its existence, there are many reasons for it to be proud of. It has many achievements that others can be envious about. Compared to many political parties in different parts of the world, AL's record can be considered exceptional.

But there are an equal number of reasons for it to be deeply concerned. Money and muscle power have replaced people's power in the day-to-day operation of this party that people once unquestioningly obeyed and unreservedly loved. Except for a few at the top, party positions today are up for grabs by the rich and the corrupt. The victory of a large number of AL's own "disobeying" candidates in the last election stands as proof as to how corrupt the original selection process was.

The party today is its own judge and jury. It only speaks to the mirror because it cannot tolerate the retort that would come if it spoke to the people. It listens only to its own music as other tunes are unpalatable. It is intoxicated by its own rhetoric and mesmerised by only those things that it wishes to see. It is a typical example of a political party living in its own bubble. And since it has monopoly control on all the levers of power, the bubble, as fragile as it is, can also be dangerous. This is so because the reality presented by the bubble can form the basis of decisions that can fatally harm us all. The handling of the issue of corruption, money laundering, misuse of power, and especially that of defaulted loans and the treatment meted out to wilful defaulters cannot be but the results of living in a bubble.

We hope we have given enough food for thought to the Awami League on its 75th anniversary.

Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star.

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The gory images of a bleeding Raoof Hasan, spokesperson for Imran Khan's party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), from a few days back were again a stark reminder of the autocratic way in which the Pakistani state under the control of its army is crushing political dissent. He was attacked on May 20 outside the office of a private TV channel by a group of four or five people, who have not been identified yet. Yet, PTI itself as well as many neutral observers are suspicious about the involvement of state spy agencies in the attack. Hasan is one of the most high-profile PTI leaders currently who are not in jail, and he is a well-respected civil society activist in his own right.

But the attack is just one of the ways in which the new regime, having the full backing of the army, has attempted to silence and sideline the opposition. Crushing dissent in Pakistan has a long history going right back to the period after its birth in 1947. The most egregious example was the massive atrocities committed in its ex-eastern wing in 1971, which led to the division of the country and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country. Since then, this pattern has continued during martial law periods as well as civilian eras with strong army control. Under PTI's regime, too, such crackdown against the present parties in power was common. It has taken a more ominous tone and higher levels since the new regime came to power in March this year. It has included jailing and disappearing opponents, filing dubious cases against them, blocking social media, passing laws to suppress free speech, and muffling the voices of political opponents on TV, in parliament and in real life.

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Hundreds of PTI senior leaders, journalists and workers continue to languish in jail on dubious charges even before conviction. Imran Khan himself has been in jail for over six months, initially without any conviction. Later, he was convicted in three or four dubious cases, some of which have been overturned by higher courts. Appeal of the last two convictions against him are in their final stages and most independent legal observers think that they will be overturned in a few days. But they also think that the state will then arrest him in other cases as they cannot take the risk of releasing him given the political instability he could cause. Other PTI leaders and workers are often released after they are forced into jail to strike a deal with the state to announce their resignation from PTI in staged press conferences upon release. Dozens of party workers have simply disappeared, either kidnapped by the state agencies or gone into hiding given the fear of being arrested.

The social media platform X (formerly twitter) remains blocked in Pakistan for over two months as the government sees it as a primary vehicle for PTI to mobilise its workers and leaders and share critical information with them. While courts have ordered the government to reinstate X services, government agencies have simply ignored the court order. Laws and policies are being adopted to silence dissent. The provincial government in Punjab passed a defamation law last week which gives sweeping powers to government-appointed tribunals to punish people who criticise government functionaries and makes it difficult to file appeals against their verdicts. Another government circular bans journalists from reporting on court proceedings given the large number of cases against PTI leaders where proceedings are going against the government.

Newspapers and TV channels face pressure from the government and intelligence agencies against giving air time to PTI leaders or including news content favourable to PTI. Many pro-PTI journalists have been forced to leave the country or go underground. The attack on Raoof Hasan was part of this effort. There are increased restrictions on covering the court proceedings being held in jail against Imran Khan, and on his party leaders trying to meet him in jail.

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While similar tactics were used by PTI against opposition parties when it was in power in 2018-22, the scale, speed and intensity of such actions is much higher now. Khan has gone to the extent of claiming that the crackdown against his party is similar to that against the Awami League in 1971 and may lead to the same consequence: division of the country. While the crackdown against PTI is highly condemnable, this comparison may be exaggerated given the scale of the atrocities that happened in 1971, which co-incidentally were committed under the command of a close relative of Imran Khan—the infamous General AK Niazi.

These abuses against PTI are happening in addition to the massive rigging against it in the February 2024 national elections. The situation is likely to get more heated in the coming months as the trials against Imran Khan and other leaders and those related to election-rigging reach their conclusion and the economic situation gets worse. Pakistan is about to enter a new IMF programme which may result in higher inflation, higher utility charges, and increased unemployment. Public discontent against the government as well as PTI's popularity will increase even though its own performance in power was poor. However, even those tactics are unlikely to lead to political instability or economic turnaround.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is also facing increased terrorist attacks from the Afghanistan-based terrorists as well as a heightened insurgency in Balochistan province, which has faced decades of atrocities like ex-East Pakistan did until 1971. Thus, Pakistan's prospects of finding peace and progress remain dim for the foreseeable future.

Dr Niaz Murtaza is an Islamabad-based political economist with a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. He can be reached at murtazaniaz@yahoo.com. His X handle is @NiazMurtaza2

Views expressed in this article are the author's own. 

Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.