Activists of Awami League today allegedly set fire to a house and a poultry farm and vandalised at least two houses of BNP supporters at Shibganj upazila of Chapainawabganj district.
AL men went to Boro Chak area around 11:30am and vandalised two to three houses and also set fire to the house of Jewel and poultry farm of Aminul Islam, our Chapainawabganj correspondent reports quoting officer-in-charge of Shibganj Police Station.
Between 1991, when democracy was restored in Bangladesh, and 2009, the Awami League and the BNP were each twice elected to office, through free, fair and inclusive elections. Unfortunately, the tenures of either party did not conspicuously serve to promote the practice of democracy and appeared to be more preoccupied with consolidating power and perpetuating a winner-take-all political culture.
In the backdrop of a bipartisan political system, the BNP has emerged as the largest political party in the country. In the absence of the AL in the political arena, in the aftermath of the post-July-August uprising, the prospect of the BNP forming the next government through a free and fair election appear propitious. Public attention is naturally focused on whether they will return as improved practitioners of democracy. In the aftermath of the uprising, remarks made by top BNP leaders on the state, governance, and practice of democracy project a renovated image of the party and has been widely appreciated by the public. However, the spectacle of the party's field-level workers moving to fill the power vacuum created by the exit of the AL from the field and appropriating the vacated opportunities for rent-seeking have aroused some concern that old habits die hard. Punitive actions by the BNP leadership against malfeasant party members do not appear to have done enough to discourage such predatory actions. Popular discontent against such misbehaviour suggests that the BNP leadership needs to act more decisively to discipline their party cadres if they are to persuade the public of their reformed identity.
In contrast, the forces which came together to overthrow the AL regime represent a fresh presence in politics and have generated their own political dynamic where a younger generation has begun to assert itself. The students have earned respect and legitimacy through their vanguard role in the July-August uprising, particularly among the younger people. They have been justifiably concerned that the old political order should not be perpetuated and demand that substantive reforms take place to ensure that a new, more just, and equitable order emerges. They have welcomed the reforms initiated by Prof Yunus but aspire to be more actively engaged in carrying forward the reform process. To do so, a segment of the students have launched a political party, the National Citizen Party (NCP). This is a welcome step.
Bangladesh has long needed a third party to challenge the duopoly exercised by the AL and the BNP for the last four decades, which has tribalised national politics. Prof Yunus made a rather mistimed and misconceived effort to establish such a third party in 2007. Its early demise did not rule out the need for a political force which would challenge the hegemony of the two parties. Jamaat is indeed another such force of political consequence. But its politics so far have been targeted to a specific ideological rather than a national constituency. It may now have wider aspirations to reach out to a broader spectrum of voters and promises to be a significant force in the forthcoming national election.
The emergence of the NCP as a prospective challenger to our dynastic politics has the attraction of novelty and the virtue of not carrying any baggage from past involvements in governance. To capitalise on such assets, the NCP would be advised to project itself as the party of the future, rather than re-fighting historical battles. Some of the student leaders have so far invested much rhetoric over rewriting the constitution and proclaiming a second (?) republic. As it transpires, their five-point declaration on displacing the four fundamental principles that have underwritten the Bangladesh constitution appears to be a largely semantic exercise, which says nothing that is not already inherent to the original fundamental principles of the constitution. Such provisions as "pluralism" are integral to the ideas of democracy and secularism. The provision of "equality" and "social justice" are essential components of the idea of socialism. Such a move to engage in constitutional dialectics appears to be driven more by a desire to re-interpret history than to redefine the fundamental values guiding the national mission.
The preoccupation of the students in engaging in such a historical discourse has left limited opportunity for them to spell out how they aspire to create a society committed to eradicate boishomyo or inequality. It has also distracted them from what should have been their primary responsibility in the post-August 5 period, providing backup to the Yunus-led interim government (IG) in restoring stability to the ravaged socio-economic landscape of Bangladesh. They could have, through organising students groups, served as a reinforcement to the weakened law enforcement agencies. They could have shown an active commitment towards challenging boishomyo by drawing attention to the problems of vulnerable groups, and could have been more proactive in protecting such groups against acts of oppression and exploitation. Such initiatives would have given the students both visibility and credibility as a new force committed to change—not just through words but actions. Such a hands-on role in civic activism would have helped to define their political identity and widened their support base beyond their student's constituency.
One of the enduring messages of politics is to fight the right war at the right time. As a consequence of their incapacity over the last several months to project a more clearly articulated vision for the future, the student movement has lost some of its lustre. The NCP's capacity to reach out to the mass of students who participated in the July-August uprising is eroding as various sections of the student's movement have remained reluctant to follow them into the NCP. It should be recognised that students are not a homogenous class with shared political views. Their immediate goal is to study, pass exams, and enter the job market, so political engagement remains a passing commitment.
To retain its student base and broaden its outreach, the NCP needs to recapture the dynamism of the July-August movement. To do this, they need to establish their political autonomy and project their promise of delivering a fresh agenda before the people. In practice, the NCP has already unnecessarily engaged themselves in the same historical dialectics which frustrated the emergence of a more workable two-party democratic system.
The NCP is already politically identifying itself on such issues as the urgency of elections (not high) and antagonism towards India, where its position is closer to the JI. The emerging political contradiction today pits the NCP and the JI against the BNP, which daily demands an early election, which it expects to win comfortably in the absence of AL as a major challenge. In contrast, the NCP needs more time to build their party, so they argue that reforms should be initiated and implemented before elections are convened, a position supported by the JI but strongly resisted by the BNP, who views this position as a delaying tactic for elections.
As the NCP moves ahead to prepare for elections, whenever they may be, it is facing up to one of the realities of Bangladeshi politics which have sadly not been resolved by any of the reform commissions. It needs to build up a sizeable war chest to contest elections. The party should, however, aim to build an election fund for itself that is above board and transparent, creating an example that other political parties can follow.
The preoccupation of the students in engaging in such a historical discourse has left limited opportunity for them to spell out how they aspire to create a society committed to eradicate boishomyo or inequality. It has also distracted them from what should have been their primary responsibility in the post-August 5 period, providing backup to the Yunus-led interim government (IG) in restoring stability to the ravaged socio-economic landscape of Bangladesh.
Reforms versus elections
Yunus is himself a strong believer in the need for reforms, but his promise to hold free and fair elections remains his most tangible commitment to the people of Bangladesh since it remains his most realisable objective. He has indicated that elections may take place between December 2025 and June 2026. This target is still to be firmed up and a roadmap clearly laid out to take the country towards elections. But there appear to be pitfalls ahead which could complicate the design of a clear guidepost.
Yunus sensibly argues that holding free and fair elections may serve little purpose if the inherited state of political malgovernance is perpetuated. Such a position, which is possibly widely shared, particularly among the students, indicates a lack of confidence in the credibility of the promises made by various political parties, but more specifically the BNP, that they are committed to structural reforms.
Yunus and the students demand substantive institutional reforms, which can bring about real change. To this end, he has set up a number of commissions populated by well-known and respected intellectuals and retired bureaucrats to recommend institutional reforms in such areas as the constitution, judiciary, public administration, police, an anti-corruption commission, an election commission, media, women's affairs, local government, health, and a task force as well as a White Paper on the economy. Many commendable reform proposals have emanated from these bodies. Surprisingly, the students/youth have been underrepresented in these commissions. Nor has there been adequate representation of women and religious or ethnic minority groups in the commissions.
It is one thing to write up reforms on paper and quite another to secure political consensus on reforms as well as to operationalise them. The IG has constituted a so-called Consensus Commission, made up of the chairs of the six commissions, headed by Yunus, and coordinated by the chair of the Commission on Constitutional Reforms, which has been empowered to draw up a concise agenda of reforms distilled from the reports of the various commissions. This agenda is to then be presented to and discussed with the political parties to establish a consensus behind the reforms.
Such a route to reform appears unusual because it does not involve either Yunus or his interim government in participating in or guiding the political task of consensus-building. As a result, the reform agenda is not identified with Yunus or his government and is the outcome of the diverse views of six different groups of experts who have themselves not been mandated to establish coherence in their particular vision for reform. It is the Consensus Commission which has now been invested by Yunus with the political challenge of building consensual support for the reforms among a heterogenous group of politicians with widely disparate electoral support and political agendas.
The initial modus operandi of the Consensus Commission has yielded a spreadsheet which puts together their proposed reform agenda in a synoptic form of 167 itemised questions on specific reforms, which are expected to be answered by each party through a quiz format limited to responses through tick-marking one of three possible options: "agree," "disagree," or "partially disagree." There is also a box attached to each question for parties to attach comments, if any, relating to the proposed reform.
Beyond indicating their preferences on each reform proposal, the political parties are also expected to tick-mark their preferred options for implementing the reforms whether by executive order of the IG, an elected constitutional assembly, or to be left to an elected parliament. This complex set of governance challenges are also spelt out in synoptic form in the spreadsheet. As anyone who has conducted such US-style examinations knows, such a process may not be able to capture the nuances and complexities which underlie each question. Nor does the spreadsheet provide scope for discussing the process through which each reform will need to be enacted and eventually implemented. Converting a "yes" response to a single-line reform proposal into a policy or legislative programme is thus likely to be a much more challenging process than preparing a commission report.
Most of the political parties, including the BNP, JI and NCP, have responded to this scholastic interrogation. It is not clear how the Consensus Commission will evaluate their answers or how they will weigh responses from the many parties with negligible electoral support and the few that command nationwide electoral support. Nor is it clear as to how the IG will relate to the consensus-building of the commission since Yunus and the IG are currently the only available institutional body with the power to move towards enacting reforms based on the evaluation of the questionnaire and consultation with the political parties.
While some reforms, classified as "low-hanging fruits," can be picked for immediate implementation by the IG, the process of actually operationalising even these reforms to a point where they yield results on the ground is likely to take time. Reforms, if they are to be carried out, will thus largely depend on the commitment and political perspective of whichever party or coalition wins the forthcoming elections and their capacity to implement the reforms. In such an undefined universe for enacting and implementing reforms by the Yunus government, the debate over reforms versus elections is somewhat theoretical and reflects contesting political strategies rather than policy differences.
Moves by the IG, under pressure from the NCP and their allies, to ban the AL or keep them out of the elections is likely to be open to contestation, both legally and politically, within the country. Nor may it find favour at the international level, particularly within the UN system. The UN has called for an inclusive election. India, in particular, is likely to make an inclusive election into an issue of both bilateral and international concern. It should be kept in mind that the exclusion of a major party such as the BNP from contesting the national elections of 2014 and 2024 and the fraudulence of the 2018 election put the legitimacy of the AL-led regime at the national and global levels under challenge throughout the last decade.
The elephant in the room
Within this still-evolving scenario, the elephant in the room remains the Awami League. The NCP wants to ban the AL. The BNP rather ambiguously argues that AL's fate should be decided by the people or the courts, whatever this means. The BNP is inhibited from taking a categorical position on this issue at this time. It would ideally like to claim that it fought a freely contested election fairly defeating all comers, particularly the AL. The party reckons a banned AL would remain a permanent source of agitation on the streets, better positioned to challenge a victorious BNP government, more so than an electorally defeated party. However, the path towards drawing the AL into the electoral arena, with its leadership in exile and other leaders and activists largely in hiding or incarcerated, remains uncertain.
How far the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) will be able to convict and sentence a significant number of AL leaders, apart from SH, through a credible judicial process remains to be seen. Many of these AL leaders, whether as ministers or MPs, may also be expected to be held accountable for various acts of corruption. This would also need to be done through a judicial process which may determine their eligibility for contesting elections.
Moving from jail cells and remand to the courtroom and passing sentence in Bangladesh is a time-consuming process if it is to be done within the rule of law. So AL's capacity to eventually contest elections remains a grey area. If such issues are resolved in time and the AL is permitted to contest, with the right to campaign on the streets for their nominated candidates, take out processions, and organise public meeting, this is likely to introduce a highly incendiary element into the electoral campaign.
Moves by the IG, under pressure from the NCP and their allies, to ban the AL or keep them out of the elections is likely to be open to contestation, both legally and politically, within the country. Nor may it find favour at the international level, particularly within the UN system. The UN has called for an inclusive election. India, in particular, is likely to make an inclusive election into an issue of both bilateral and international concern. It should be kept in mind that the exclusion of a major party such as the BNP from contesting the national elections of 2014 and 2024 and the fraudulence of the 2018 election put the legitimacy of the AL-led regime at the national and global levels under challenge throughout the last decade. The exclusion of a major political party such as the AL, however discredited it may be, is hardly likely to keep the forthcoming elections immune from challenge.
Bangladesh is today led by Muhammad Yunus, a universally respected person of unquestioned integrity. FILE PHOTO: PID
Prof Yunus recently said that the next election in Bangladesh would be the most free and fair. In this context, we can recall that in 1991, the Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed caretaker government, of which I was privileged to be a member, received much applause both at home and abroad for holding a free, fair, peaceful, and fully inclusive election. In that election, the ousted military dictator HM Ershad's Jatiya Party won 35 seats in parliament. Ershad himself won in five constituencies while he was under house arrest in Gulshan. A veteran Indian journalist, Nikhil Chakravarty, editor of the weekly Mainstream, who was a member of a team of election observers, termed the Shahabuddin election as the freest and fairest election he had witnessed in his lifetime.
The pathway to national elections, whether in December 2025 or in 2026, is not likely to be so smooth. Whenever the election campaign hits the streets, we will get a sense of how far the attempt by the IG to build a consensus to ensure a more peaceful political process has built up any traction. The contested social and political landscape is already manifesting itself through the growing visibility of attempts by extremist forces to use the more congenial environment provided by the IG to more openly express themselves. This has created an increasing sense of insecurity for women in public spaces and an enhanced sense of vulnerability for indigenous and religious minorities. Threats of violence voiced by extremist groups and expatriate influencers using social media indicate that the freedom to practise a particular brand of politics or voice uncomfortable opinions can no longer be taken for granted. If such acts of violence are to remain a relevant factor in the practice of democracy, even under the Yunus-led government, the emergence of a reformed democratic order based on public reasoning is going to remain elusive.
In this fast-evolving political environment, the IG may find that its most challenging agenda remains to prevent a further deterioration in the condition of the economy and to bring about some visible improvements within their tenure. While some improvements in the economy have been registered under the IG, the recent decision by the Trump administration to expose Bangladesh's principal exports to a regime of high tariffs has added a further element of uncertainty for the IG's management of the economy. The law and order situation remains a matter of continuing concern. Failure to effectively manage the economy and the law and order situation could erode the credibility and authority of the IG, which remains crucial to ensure a transition to a free and fair election with a peaceful transfer of power to an elected government.
Fortunately, prospects for change are not without hope. Bangladesh is today led by Muhammad Yunus, a universally respected person of unquestioned integrity. Attempts across the border to paint him as an intolerant fundamentalist with a hunger for power lack credibility and hence appear tendentious in intent. His presence as the head of the IG has provided the country with a rare moment where governance and policy decisions are largely made not for personal benefits, but for the greater good. Some of these decisions may be unwise, governance may be deficient in some areas, but the commitment of the regime remains sincere. If such a regime cannot lead the way towards substantive change, then Bangladesh may indeed face another era of disappointment and discontent.
Prof Rehman Sobhan, one of Bangladesh's most distinguished economists and a celebrated public intellectual, is founder and chairman of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
On October 7, 2006, a nervous yet fearless Shakib Al Hasan stepped onto the field in Mohali for his first ICC event match, just two months after his international debut. Bangladesh had lost that game against a vastly superior Sri Lanka in the Champions Trophy, but the 19-year-old left-hander stood tall, crafting a team-high, unbeaten 67 -- an innings that whispered of the greatness to come.
A little over eighteen years later, that story should have reached its natural conclusion, with Shakib signing off in the very tournament where he first made his mark. Instead, when Bangladesh boarded their flight to the UAE for the Champions Trophy, their finest product was missing.
The Champions Trophy was supposed to be his final stage. Before the Kanpur Test last year, Shakib spoke openly about bowing out after the 2025 edition. Instead, his career ended in limbo. The Bangladesh jersey he had worn in battle for nearly two decades never touched his shoulders again.
His absence had little to do with form or age. Off-field turmoil pulled him away. When the Awami League government fell on August 5, the political landscape shifted. Shakib, associated with the ruling party, was caught in the storm. The writing was on the wall.
Then came the final blow. In a County match, his bowling action was reported, leading to suspension following failed bowling-action tests. And with that, Shakib's 18-year journey in ICC events ended abruptly after having appeared in a staggering 16 marquee tournaments, featuring five ODI World Cups.
No fitting farewell at a mega event. No last walk to the crease. Yet, the bitter irony remains: Bangladesh might not have even been in the Champions Trophy if not for Shakib.
November 6, 2023. Delhi. Bangladesh were in a free fall following six straight losses in the World Cup. However, qualification for the Champions Trophy was on the line. A loss to Sri Lanka would end Bangladesh's hopes.
Shakib, captain in name and spirit, knew what was at stake. After Sri Lanka had started strong, he struck twice; the dangerous Sadeera Samarawickrama, his second victim. Then came the moment that had the cricket world divided.
Angelo Mathews arrived at the crease late due to a helmet malfunction. Shakib appealed. The umpires had no choice -- Mathews was timed out, the first such dismissal in international cricket history. Critics called it unsporting, while others saw it as ruthless pragmatism.
Then, with the bat, he delivered once more. A blistering 82 off 65 balls. A 169-run stand with Najmul Hossain Shanto. It was their first ICC event win over Sri Lanka. More importantly, Bangladesh had finished eighth by the time the tournament ended, qualifying for the Champions Trophy by the slimmest of margins -- on net run rate.
And yet, when the team prepared for the Champions Trophy, Shakib remained out of the frame. Even the Bangladesh captain Shanto was left an agitated figure when asked a Shakib-related question in the press conference, which took place before the team departed for the UAE. Can one blame him, though? Entering an ICC event without a player who had managed to somehow station himself mostly at the top of ODI rankings since 2009, it may well be that Shakib's teammates are trying a little too hard to move on without him.
The Champions Trophy had been the setting for some of his finest moments: his debut in 2006; the unforgettable partnership with Mahmudullah in 2017; guiding Bangladesh to their first-ever ICC semifinal appearance. And now, it was the stage to complete the circle, culminating an illustrious career.
But life rarely offers the endings we expect. What is lotted cannot be blotted, they say, so perhaps this tournament was never meant to be his swansong. Instead, he remains a figure frozen in time.
And so, the curtain falls. Not with a roaring crowd, but with the lingering silence of what could have been.
Body:
History has a way of repeating itself, often with different actors but the same tragic plotlines. The fall of Sheikh Hasina's Awami League government has left behind a political landscape harshly familiar to students of history and political psychology. The party's steadfast refusal to acknowledge its mistakes, its insistence on conspiracy theories, and its remorseless demeanour all indicate a textbook case of cognitive dissonance. As the pioneering social psychologist Leon Festinger argued, when confronted with overwhelming evidence contradicting deeply held beliefs, people do not necessarily change their views; instead, they double down.
Festinger's seminal work on cognitive dissonance explains the mental discomfort experienced when reality clashes with pre-existing beliefs. In the 1950s, he infiltrated a doomsday cult whose members were convinced the world would end on a specific date. When the prophecy failed, rather than admitting their mistake, the cultists rationalised their beliefs by claiming their faith had saved the world. This pattern, where individuals or groups faced with disconfirming evidence refuse to accept reality, is now on full display in the Awami League.
For more than 15 years, Sheikh Hasina and her party built a political fortress based on dominance, authoritarian tendencies, and the erosion of democratic institutions. Opposition parties were crushed, the media muzzled, and electoral mechanisms hijacked to perpetuate her rule. When the walls of this fortress crumbled under the weight of mass protests, Hasina and her followers did not introspect. Instead, they sought solace in an alternative narrative: their downfall was not due to popular outrage but rather an international conspiracy.
The Greek concept of hubris—the excessive pride that leads to downfall—perfectly encapsulates the Awami League's attitude. Political scientist Graham Allison's theory of organisational failure suggests that when institutions become too entrenched in their ways, they resist necessary adaptation even in the face of imminent collapse.
This is evident in Hasina's unchanging rhetoric, even after her government was ousted. Leaked phone conversations reveal her solid belief that she was the victim of a grand design. Despite evidence that her government's mishandling of the student-led movement resulted in mass casualties, Hasina and her exiled ministers refuse to acknowledge any wrongdoing. This is not merely political stubbornness but a deeper psychological need to avoid self-recrimination.
Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that people avoid self-reflection because it forces them to confront their own responsibility. If Hasina were to admit that her government collapsed due to internal corruption, misgovernance, and public outrage, she would have to struggle with a lifetime of political miscalculations. The easier option, as cognitive dissonance theory suggests, is to alter the narrative.
Political history is rife with examples of leaders who refused to accept responsibility for their downfall. US President Richard Nixon, after Watergate, remained convinced that he was the victim of a media-driven witch hunt. In more recent history, Donald Trump's continued insistence that the 2020 US presidential election was stolen shows a similar psychological mechanism at play.
The Awami League's strategy of non-apology serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it provides a coping mechanism for its leaders and supporters, many of whom have invested their careers and reputations in the party's narrative. Admitting failure would be personally and professionally devastating. Secondly, by externalising blame, the party keeps alive the possibility of a political resurgence. If the narrative remains that the Awami League was unjustly removed rather than rightfully ousted, its leaders can mobilise support on the promise of a return to power.
However, this strategy carries long-term risks. Philosopher Hannah Arendt, in her analysis of totalitarian regimes, observed that when political parties rely on manufactured narratives to sustain their existence, they become increasingly disconnected from reality. The more the Awami League insists that it was the victim of a grand conspiracy, the less likely it is to engage in the necessary reforms to regain public trust. In a democracy, no party can survive indefinitely without a genuine social contract with its citizens.
One of the most revealing aspects of the Awami League's downfall is the reaction of its grassroots activists. Many have gone into hiding, not because they were part of the violent suppression of protests, but because they feel abandoned. These were the foot soldiers who once championed the party's cause, only to find themselves leaderless in its darkest hour.
Political theorist Antonio Gramsci wrote extensively about how political movements sustain themselves through "organic intellectuals" at the grassroots level. These are the local leaders, student activists, and community organisers who serve as the bridge between ideology and the masses. However, when a party's leadership becomes too insular and removed from ground realities, this bridge collapses.
The Awami League's grassroots members now face an internal dilemma: do they continue to defend a leadership that refuses to acknowledge them, or do they begin seeking alternative political affiliations? This is where cognitive dissonance becomes an individual as well as a collective phenomenon. For years, these activists believed they were part of a righteous cause. The reality that their leaders abandoned them in exile creates a painful internal contradiction, one that can only be resolved in two ways: either by continuing to believe in the party despite its failures, or by breaking away and facing an uncertain political future.
Acknowledging mistakes is not a sign of weakness; it is a prerequisite for political rehabilitation. Countries with strong democratic traditions have seen fallen parties regain public trust by embracing self-reform. Germany's Social Democratic Party, after years of political decline, rebounded by admitting past mistakes and adjusting its policies. Even in Bangladesh's own history, parties that have embraced change have managed to return to relevance.
Charles Darwin famously stated, "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change." If the Awami League wishes to remain politically relevant, it must recognise this fundamental truth. Denial, conspiracy theories, and deflecting responsibility may serve as temporary shields against the pain of political loss, but they do not constitute a long-term strategy for survival.
H. M. Nazmul Alam is an academic, journalist, and political analyst. He can be reached at [email protected].
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
Having been a journalist since 1972 and an editor-publisher since 1993, it saddens me deeply to see some editors, instead of embellishing, strengthening, and bringing more honour and dignity to their position, are doing the exact opposite: bringing shame, disrepute, and indignity by acting as public relations officers (PROs) of their owners.
Editorship is, no doubt, a job. However, far more importantly, it is a position of public trust. It is on that trust that the credibility of a particular media outlet depends, which, at the end of the day, determines its success. An editor must adhere to the fundamental ethics of journalism: truth, objectivity, honesty, and a complete absence of bias. Every story must be fact-based, verified by multiple sources, and the person or the institution being written about be given a chance to respond. Yes, proprietors may, and can and sometimes do, have an agenda of their own, but it is the editor's duty to protect his/her institution from gross misuse.
A prerequisite of being an editor—qualities far more important than his/her ability to write, edit, direct, lead, brief reporters, have a nose for stories, etc—is to have sufficient self-respect, personal courage, and dignity to never to allow the media under his control to be used to spread lies and hatred, defame, and falsely malign. When a proprietor forces an editor to publish something, the latter must ensure two things: one, that it is fact-based; and, two, that the other side is given a chance to respond. If all his/her efforts fail, he/she should resign and go public to show how he/she tried to save journalism from being exploited. That is how the editorial institution is built and the public respect for it grows.
It is not uncommon for proprietors and editors to have political leanings. But that should be in the opinion section and should never cloud reporting, which should only be fact-based and adhere to the fundamental ethics of journalism.
A proprietor can own anything permitted by law. But there is a difference between owning a shoe factory and a pharmaceutical company. As the owner of the former, he/she can experiment with practically anything: design, colour, material, shape, etc. But in the case of the latter, the owner must totally and completely submit to the professional management and allow complete freedom to operate the factory according to all scientific specifications. Can an owner tell a doctor how to treat a patient or which medicine to prescribe for which malady? Similarly, the media must be run by professional journalists. An owner must allow total independence of the professionals, led by the editor, to run a media establishment in an unbiased and fact-based manner.
The purpose of this column is to raise the issue of owner-driven journalism versus professional journalism, a PRO-editorship versus professional editorship.
Let us remember with pride that only two professions are given protection in any democratic country's constitution: the judiciary and mass media. Why? Because experience has shown that an independent judiciary acts as a pillar of democracy, and free media serves the essential purpose of assuring accountability and transparency of the governance process.
What I write below—without mentioning the names of either the newspapers or their editors—is not aimed at shaming journalists or fellow editors, but at raising the issue of how we are destroying the editorial institution and thereby bringing disrepute and ignominy to our highly esteemed profession.
On February 23, three newspapers—two Bangla and one English—published the same report, with the same headline, "Prothom Alo, Daily Star: The 'masterminds' behind plot to eliminate Begum Zia from politics," referring to the events that occurred in 2007—18 years ago. What sort of journalism is it when the same text—word for word—is published in multiple newspapers, each claiming it to be written by their own "special correspondent"? What does it say about the "editor's" authority in deciding on content? Where does such content originate from, what is the process of its verification, and what leads editors to carry such content without any explanation to its readers? This is when editors relinquish their authority and become PROs of their media owners.
The story line is: Prothom Alo and The Daily Star masterminded the ouster of Khaleda Zia from politics. The reports begin like this, "In 2007, a blueprint was devised to destroy democracy in Bangladesh and depoliticise the country. One of the key architects of the blueprint was the Prothom Alo and The Daily Star group. The two newspapers not only played (a) key role in formulating the plan but also engaged in relentless smear campaigns to eliminate BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia from politics."
The origin of the story is a press conference held by Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan, the then secretary general of BNP, which was covered by all newspapers and TV stations at the time. We were able to gather the following few: "Khaleda Zia baad" by Ittefaq; "Khaleda Zia out" by Sangbad; "BNP's reform initiative keeping Khaleda Zia out" (translated) by Inquilab; "Proposal to reduce the power of BNP chairperson" (translated) by Naya Diganta; "BNP reform plan shows door to Khaleda" by The Bangladesh Observer; and "BNP's reform proposals" (translated) by Janakantha. The reports of the three newspapers singled us out and did not mention that all others newspapers published the same story. We had similar heading and content as the others.
What is striking is that this very line of propaganda was followed by the fallen regime, which is now being repeated by these three papers. The Daily Star and Prothom Alo—because we spoke truth to power—were accused by Sheikh Hasina and Awami League ministers and party leaders that we were behind the 1/11 army-backed caretaker government—again without submitting an iota of proof. For 15 years, Hasina and her party held unquestioned power. They must have investigated us as thoroughly as can be imagined. They found no proof. That is why, in spite of lodging 84 cases against this writer—16 of which were for sedition—they did not follow through.
On what basis, using what proof did the three newspapers' journalists write this common copy, and why did three separate editors allow this story to be printed? What fact-checking did they do? What sort of authentic—as against biased—investigation did they undertake? And how could the editors violate the most basic norm of journalism, and not give the subjects of the report any chance to respond?
Among many reforms that Bangladeshi newspapers must undertake—and we are looking forward to the report of the Media Reform Commission—an important one is to move away from "owner-driven journalism" to "editor-driven journalism."
The three newspapers in question have published false, twisted, distorted reports against us many times before, similarly without evidence. On April 21, 2011, the Bangladesh Press Council passed a stern judgement against one of the said newspapers on its reporting against Matiur Rahman, editor of Prothom Alo, saying that "… reporting constituted yellow journalism which is a violation of newspaper ethics." A similar judgement was passed against the other Bangla newspaper on May 12, 2011 on another report against the Prothom Alo editor, saying "… the report was false, fictitious and was an example of yellow journalism." On both occasions, the editors and publisher of those newspapers were reprimanded. Similar condemnatory judgements was passed by the press council and delivered against all three newspapers on May 22-24, 2013, who were accused of publishing false, fictitious, derogatory, and unsubstantiated news against Prothom Alo and its editor.
Recently, I came across a term in Bangla—"shikari sangbadikota" ("target journalism"), meaning journalism designed to target an individual, institution, personality, editor, or newspaper without proof. The purpose is to denigrate, malign or discredit someone. Just as one hires an assassin to kill someone, one hires "shikari sangbadik" to assassinate the character of a person of high repute or a newspaper of high standing.
I appealed to journalists in a piece I wrote on April 7, 2023, titled "Only journalists can protect journalism." This was in response to a vicious, Goebbels-style campaign, conducted by a private TV station against Prothom Alo about a photo of a child published with a quote from a day labourer as a photo card. The TV station accused Prothom Alo of "conspiring to destabilise our independence and make our Liberation War questionable." The Prothom Alo editor was sued under the infamous Digital Security Act (DSA) and his Savar correspondent was picked up, gangster-style, without a warrant. Sadly, other than the Dhaka Reporters Unity (DRU), no other journalists' body or media organisation said a word.
Today, I appeal again to all journalists, and especially to fellow editors, to move away from all our past prejudice, hatred, biases, and tendency to make fatal compromises and, alongside rebuilding Bangladesh in the post-July-August 2024 era, also rebuild journalism with renewed pledge to our journalistic ethos and commitment to democracy, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and public service.
Editors, please don't sacrifice your dignity and become PROs of the proprietors.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star.
A clash erupted between two factions of Awami League yesterday over establishing dominance in Chabbishpara area under Jazira upazila of Shariatpur.
Tension prevailed in the area as members of the two groups staged showdown with local weapons such as machetes, cleavers, and spears, and exploded over 100 crude bombs yesterday afternoon, leaving a teenage boy seriously injured.
Injured Sabbir Khalasi, 19, was rescued and sent to Dhaka for medical treatment.
"A clash broke out between two factions in Joynagar union over establishing dominance and long-standing dispute. They exploded crude bombs and brandished local weapons. The situation is now under control following drives by police and joint forces. No case has been filed yet, but discussions are ongoing with higher authorities on whether police will file one," said Mohammad Dulal Akand, officer-in-charge of Jazira Police Station.
On information, joint forces including police, Rab and army personnel conducted a prompt operation. Meanwhile, the area has become devoid of men as many went into hiding fearing arrest. Although joint operations are ongoing, no one has been arrested and no weapons have been recovered so far.
According to locals, the two AL factions are led by Mithun Dhali, former general secretary of Tejgaon College unit of Bangladesh Chhatra League, and Halim Talukder, a member of Joynagar Union Parishad. As both of them are now in hiding, their respective followers Jasim Talukder and Noor Alam Sardar are currently leading at the local level.
Jasim's follower Sajal Chokdar was assaulted on Saturday night, triggering the clash yesterday afternoon. At one point, followers of Noor Alam hurled crude bombs at the opposing side, injuring Sabbir Khalasi. This was followed by an hour-long clash, chases and counter-chases, and explosions.
Fatema Begum, aunt of Sabbir, said, "The bomb injured his hand severely. We don't know if his hand can be saved."
On April 5, a similar clash occurred in Bilashpur union of Jazira, where over a hundred crude bombs were exploded, creating a nationwide uproar.
Jasim and Noor Alam could not be reached for their comment as their phones were found switched off.
সাধারণত বৃষ্টি নামলেই ‘আগুন’ লাগে সবজির বাজারে। সাধারণ ক্রেতাদের সাধারণত শুনতে হয় ‘বৃষ্টি’র কথা। ‘বৃষ্টির কারণেই’ সবজির দাম বাড়ে। অথচ বাংলাদেশ ট্রেড অ্যান্ড ট্যারিফ কমিশন (বিটিটিসি) বলছে ভিন্ন কথা।