Governance Update
Arab revolt
Complexities of
democratic transition
Kazi Haque
The Arab World is also not going to be same after the popular revolts succeeded in overthrowing long-standing authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. The indications are abound, country after country. No new regime collapsed though ever since sudden dramatic collapse of the Ben Ali regime of Tunisia and more dramatic but rather gradual collapse of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak regime. But chain of events keeps unsettling the Arab rulers remaining in power.
By and large, there is similarity in the gathering pace of ongoing protests and the corresponding government reactions. There is consistent protest demanding for either resignation of incumbent government (as in Yemen, Bahrain and Libya) or large-scale political and economic reforms (as in Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Oman). The incumbent governments on the other hand are in the mood of playing 'carrot and stick' with protesters until there is enough momentum to force them out of power.
The most gruesome exception is Libya where the anti Gaddafi protest movement evolved into a civil war accompanied by human casualties, destruction of property and population exodus in large-scales. Gaddafi regime lost most of the country except the capital Tripoli and some adjacent towns to the opposition in the initial setback. However in massive and violent counter-attack the regime recovered most of the territory except Benghazi initially lost to the rebels. The military weakness of the rebels coupled with the international community's inertia in taking decisive action enabled Gaddafi forces to gain upper hand. There was call for military aid to the rebels and imposition of no fly zone from the earlier days of the conflict. No fly zone was finally sanctioned last Thursday and subsequently enforced through western air and missile attacks. Further escalation of conflict is apparent while fall of Gaddafi and subsequent transition to democracy seems unlikely any time soon.
Throughout the region, this was a blowback to pro-democracy protests and a form of encouragement to the regimes facing them. That is why government crackdown on protesters is becoming much more violent in Yemen and Bahrain. Yemen stepped up its crackdown after expelling all foreign journalists from the country. Bahrain slapped a 3-month emergency and Saudi military is joining with Bahrain security forces in curbing protests.
There is always a political economy of democratic transition as noted by renowned scholars Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman in their article titled “The Political Economy of Democratic Transition” published in volume 29 (no. 3) of the journal Comparative Politics in 1997. This is all the more true for the Arab countries due to their geopolitical eminence. Some of them are world's main oil suppliers and almost all of them are important fronts in the “war against terror.”
The political economy context of these countries is crucial in shaping democratic transition. Interest articulation of powerful actors is likely to determine scope and configuration of the transition strategies. Organized protesters, youth groups, citizen journalists, news media, civil society, political parties, religious or social movements, ruling elites, military, intelligence agencies, civil bureaucracy, oil companies, foreign powers, religious clergy, business tycoons, Arab League and United Nations are some such actors in this case.
Among them the first 5-7 actors are at the forefront of the ongoing pro-democracy protests. Bulks of the remaining domestic actors are constituents of the authoritarian status-quo. They are suffering from legitimacy crisis at the moment against the ongoing mass protests. But they are in possession of wealth, arms, powerful foreign backers and other sources of political and social power. A democratic transition is not in their current best interests since they grew out of and gained from the authoritarian regimes. They will side with the authoritarian status-quo as long as they can. They may side with pro-democracy protesters when the regime's fall is apparent. In Yemen, for example, as anti-government protest is growing unabated powerful allies of the President are siding with them. The ever growing list so far include the head of the country's biggest tribe, a group of top military commanders and many senior diplomats including the country's ambassador to the UN. But even if powerful beneficiaries of an authoritarian regime switch loyalty amid gathering momentum of popular protest they will not necessarily facilitate democratic transition. As in Tunisia, military-backed interim government replaced the previous regimes and they are often manned by same old faces. Interim national unity government demanded by many is yet to happen. Institutional reforms necessary for free, fair and open general elections are taking place in snail's pace.
Effective democratic transition strategies are necessary at this point for pro-democracy forces within the protesting countries as well as their foreign and international allies. The legitimacy of the public demand for democratic transition in the aforementioned countries is already established. This is evident from massive turnout in street protests, social media activism and public reactions captured in news media. But without appropriate democratic transition strategies, the pro-democracy momentum can be lost. It can descend into chaos like the civil war currently raging on in Libya or the one that followed American invasion of Iraq. Otherwise, new regimes may take over who are again autocratic or whose democratic credentials are questionable. Worse, there can be more foreign invasions for oil in the names of freedom and democracy.
However, developing effective democratic transition strategies for the Arab world is very challenging due to long lack of democratic tradition, many powerful domestic actors' lack of interest in democracy and unwillingness of powerful foreign and international actors. The pro-democracy actors mentioned above of the protesting Arab countries have to work together to consolidate democratic transition. This should be easier despite the above mentioned structural constraints with advantages of ICT and loosing grip of the ruling elites. Global civil society, the pro-democracy activists, groups and foundations in other countries whom operate across border, can come to their aid. UN Secretary General can also play a crucial supportive role despite lack of actual interest among powerful UN member states. Since these states control UN Security Council, the main UN organ for political affairs, Baan Ki-moon rather capitalize on resources directly under the secretary general's office like the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF).
The writer is Senior Lecturer, Civil Service College, Dhaka.
