An uneasy stability the likely outcome

On Sunday, Bangladesh is going to the much-discussed national polls that the international community is closely watching. The stance taken by the US-led Western bloc and China, Russia and India over the election is far from harmonious. Washington announced visa policy in May this year but has been quiet in the weeks leading up to the polls. What has changed? Or has anything changed?

Michael Kugelman, director at the South Asia Institute of Washington-based think-tank, the Wilson Center, shared his views in an email interview with The Daily Star on Wednesday.

DS: The US has been quiet for the last couple of months on Bangladesh polls, after a series of visits and remarks on free and fair polls here. Is it India that pursued the US?

Michael: I don't think India was the trigger behind the US silence. However, the fact that the two sides discussed Bangladesh during the 2+2 dialogue in New Delhi in November -- around the time the US went quiet -- is not insignificant.

Still, I suspect the US made the wise decision to step back because the political environment was getting increasingly volatile with the election drawing closer. There would have been so much scrutiny on anything said by the US, with a heightened chance of the comments being misconstrued or politicised in a way that could be detrimental to both the US and Bangladesh. That is not what the US would want, especially given that it has repeatedly underscored that it doesn't have a preferred party or preferred election outcome.

DS: There were talks of possible sanctions. What is your take on it?

Michael: It's tough to know how the US will react after the polls because it has not really spelled out what its criteria are for free and fair elections in Bangladesh. This means it's hard to know what the US will be looking for as it considers whether to resort to punitive actions like sanctions or more visa restrictions. If inclusivity is a critical element, then the US would not respond favourably, given the BNP boycott. If a level playing field is a critical element, the US would not respond favourably, given the extensive pre-election crackdowns on the BNP. But if the key elements are things like relatively good turnout and low levels of violence, the US response may not be as harsh.

For me, the key factor is the BNP boycott. It stands out in a big way. Will the US evaluate the election's credibility by focusing on the boycott itself, or on the factors that prompted the boycott? The US response could be less favourable, and harsher if it emphasises the latter over the former.

There are also the strategic questions: The US values its trade ties with Bangladesh. It's the largest destination for Bangladesh's exports. Commercial ties have grown. Also, US officials now describe Dhaka as a strategic partner. Would the Biden administration want to risk throwing that all away? Or is the relationship not so critical that the US has to worry about such risks? Washington will need to weigh these factors and more.

DS: The polls will be held with the BNP and its allies boycotting. How do you predict the scenario in the aftermath of the polls?

Michael: The Awami League will presumably win the election and form the next government, but beyond that, the forecast is a bit fuzzier. One key signpost to watch is the BNP's next move. With most of its leaders in jail and the party facing another harsh round of crackdowns, it could simply lie low, play a long game, and focus on plans for the future. In that case, one can expect relative stability in the immediate term. But if it chooses instead to come out and contest the election, then the possibility of unrest and stability risks in the near term are higher.

Another important signpost to watch is Sheikh Hasina's next move. Will she extend an olive branch to the opposition? Or will she maintain her hard line? Given that Bangladesh's politics are so poisoned by polarisation, I don't expect any attempts toward reconciliation. And that suggests the environment will remain tense, even if relatively stable. That's perhaps the most likely scenario, at least in the immediate post-election period: An uneasy stability.

DS: Some experts think that the next government will be more authoritarian. How will Washington and other global powers react to it?

Michael: Washington engages with and embraces plenty of authoritarian states, so a turn toward authoritarianism in Bangladesh would not by itself trigger a hard-line response from Washington. US reactions to the next government in Bangladesh will be based on how it perceives the election, and whether it sees the election as free and fair based on its criteria that are, at least in the public eye, not terribly apparent.

I don't think Bangladesh's foreign policy will be impacted in a big way if the government is more authoritarian. Its close ties with New Delhi will continue, and its cordial relations with Beijing will endure as well. And it will keep pursuing friendly ties with Moscow, which appear to have reached a new level last year, with the Russian foreign minister's trip to Dhaka and the visit of several Russian warships. Let's be clear. If Bangladesh becomes a virtual one-party state, that will have major implications for democracy and other conditions at home, but not on the country's nonaligned foreign policy, which will be unaffected and shall endure.

Dhaka's relations with the West are tougher to predict. The countries that have put the most pressure on Bangladesh to hold free and fair elections happen to be some of its most important trade partners. These key economic partners are the most likely to respond unfavourably to the election. So, while Dhaka will be keen to keep pursuing trade relations with the West, the elections could deliver a blow to its relations with the West. This could have troubling implications, especially for Bangladesh's economic interests.

DS: Can Bangladesh manage the economy after the polls?

Michael: The question of the economy post-election is critical. The Awami League has long pointed to economic growth as a major achievement, and it likely aims to use it as something to distract from the ugly side of the party's governance. Indeed, despite lots of democratic backsliding in Bangladesh in recent years, we haven't seen countries, including in the West, pull back from their trade with one of Asia's best-performing economies.

But what the AL has long projected as a crowning achievement is now at risk of coming crashing down. There is high inflation and debt. Conflict in the Middle East could deliver blows to energy security in a country already grappling with shortages. Sustaining growth could also be tough with a continued overreliance on textile exports—not to mention, in due course, climate change effects. Imagine a worst-case post-election scenario for Dhaka, where not only the US but also the EU slapped trade sanctions on Bangladesh. That could present Hasina with her most serious economic policy challenge yet.

There's also a political dimension to this. If the economy tanks, the BNP would have a major vulnerability to exploit. In fact, they already did this back in December 2022. As economic stress began to mount, they mobilised and held large protests, demonstrating their continued capacity to challenge the government. Certainly, the BNP has been hit hard by crackdowns in the months since then, suggesting limitations to their ability to mobilise. But then again many didn't expect they'd be able to rise up as they did more than a year ago.

And herein lies a potential conundrum for Hasina: If the economy is under severe stress, and a galvanised BNP can mount a new protest movement, the AL may feel compelled to crack down, leading to serious violence and other unrest that could deter foreign investors at a moment when Bangladesh badly needs their capital.