From family structures to politico-legal frameworks, deeply rooted patriarchal views have historically influenced every aspect of life. Even secular laws enacted in the 19th and 20th centuries were shaped by overwhelmingly male-dominated legislative bodies. Gender norms during these times were deeply influenced by male chauvinism, with men being regarded as the dominant figure in both public and private spheres, while women were subjected to submission and obedience. Consequently, these laws bear the imprint of a patriarchal view, privileging male authority over women's agency.

Victim-blaming and character assassination of women, especially in cases of rape, have been extremely common in legal practice. In fact, they were legally authorised and often weaponised against women for a long time through sections 146 and 155(4) of the Evidence Act 1872. The Evidence (Amendment) Act 2022 was passed very recently which restricted this practice of harassment of rape victims. Nonetheless, this institutionalised sexism persists in Bangladesh, continuing to directly or indirectly favour violence against women.

This traditional view persisted even after our independence, with the constituent assembly being composed mostly of men who carried forward the entrenched assumptions. It is reflected in Article 28(2) of our Constitution, which states that women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and of public life. The phrase 'equal rights with men' underlies an implicit patriarchal assumption of positioning men as the standard against which women's rights are to be weighed. Men are positioned as the implicit baseline, while women are given equality "with" them rather than independently. The Article could have been phrased as "Men and women shall have equal rights", placing both genders on equal footing, without one serving as the reference point for the other. Again, Article 28(4) classifies women as a "backward section" and permits the enactment of separate laws for them. It raises an important question as to whether the objective of closing the gender gap can be achieved by enacting special laws while classifying women as backward. In that case, it could be argued that the 1972 Constitution did not establish true gender equality, rather affirms the traditional notion of gender equity.

As Bangladesh stands at a crossroads and await reforms, the patriarchal legacies embedded in its laws need to be scrutinised, challenged, and, in some cases, amended to better align with principles of equality and human rights.

Discriminatory provisions were also incorporated within our citizenship law. Section 5 of the Citizenship Act 1951, for example, historically placed restrictions on Bangladeshi women's ability to pass citizenship to their children if they married foreign nationals. However, this section was amended by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2009 by replacing the word 'father' with 'father and mother', thus allowing both father and mother equal rights to pass citizenship to their children.

Even under our adultery law, women are regarded as inactive participants when it comes to bearing liability. Section 497 of the Penal Code 1860 implicitly views women as lacking agency by placing the burden of guilt solely on men in cases of extramarital affairs.

These laws, therefore, reinforce the traditional gender-based stereotypes. As Bangladesh stands at a crossroads and awaits reforms, the patriarchal legacies embedded in its laws need to be scrutinised, challenged, and, in some cases, amended to better align with principles of equality and human rights.

The writer is an LLM candidate at Bangladesh University of Professionals.