A Circle Squared in Kandahar

The 'hijack drama' showed that India needs to go out of its way in improving its relationship with neighbours, says Pran Chopra

THERE ARE lessons to be drawn from every single scene of the "hijack drama", from Kathmandu, where it showed up a longstanding diplomatic failure; to Amritsar, where it started a frenzy of self-deception and self-flagellation; to New Delhi, where it triggered an exercise in squaring a circle; to Kandahar, where unjustified recrimination clouded diplomatic possibilities; to the epilogue, which once again shows India's formidable ability to shoot itself in the foot.

The pilot of the ill-fated plane, Captain Devi Sharan, says that at the last checkpoint at Kathmandu airport, where a camera X-rays the hand baggage, he saw that the staff member manning the monitor, whose mind and eyes should have been on the screen, was busy knitting away. But that apart, four things have been known to Indian authorities for years. First, Indian Airlines has been hit most often by hijackers; second, it is the favourite target of Pakistan-related hijackers; third, Nepal has become a notorious base of Pakistani operations against India; and fourth, security at Kathmandu is extremely lax.

Why did India fail to do anything about this deadly mix, when Indo-Nepal relations are a dense network of mutual inter-dependence and means of mutual persuasion? Does the failure lie with the master-minders of our foreign policy or lower level operators?

Many political parties have ruled each country. All of them owe an answer to both peoples. How do they propose to improve matters?

Our responses also failed us at Amritsar. There was time enough to block the plane but because it was allowed to escape a howl of protest went up from virtually all "experts" in the security, strategic, media fraternity, who called it a blunder. But the protest proved only two things: first, how utterly wrong famous experts can be, and second, how thoroughly a frenzied pack can smother dissenting judgement and distort policy-making.

It is very clear that till the time some of the hostages were released at Dubai the Indian authorities, through no fault of theirs, had not had any chance to assess the number, the nationality, the aims, the demands, the weaponry of the hijackers, the levels of their determination or desperation. These assessments emerge only, and then also slowly, when a dialogue begins with the hijackers to probe what would be their price for releasing how many hostages, what price they would be determined to pay for holding on to how much of their "catch", and what would be the likely loss of life if the negotiations broke down and violent action against them became unavoidable.

But none of this was known in Amritsar, and in such a void of information it would have been most unwise to take any of the other three available options: first, to block the plane; second, to storm it and hope for the best; third, to storm it and bear the worst as best we may. It is obvious that the first option would have triggered the second if the hijackers became desperate, and the cost of the third would have been limited only by the number of the hijackers and the destructive power of their weaponry.

Captain Devi Sharan was therefore quite right when he said to me that his plane was in a different situation from the one which, at the same airport, in Amritsar, was stormed by. K.P.S. Gill, because that plane, it was fairly well known by then, had only one hijacker and he was lightly armed.

In these circumstances, the "failure" to block this plane turned out to be a blunder "averted", not "committed", to quote the headline of a piece which, without the gift of hindsight, I wrote in one newspaper the day after the plane landed in Kandahar, and which attracted only derision at the hands of the same fraternity. But hindsight has further vindicated the headline. The pilot has expressed clear agreement with it, and his account of later events has confirmed that the first option would have surely led to the third.

He says when the delays in refuelling the plane at Amritsar aroused the suspicion of the hijackers they demanded he must face death or take off at once for Lahore. He pleaded lack of fuel for that, but the captors told him they would rather die in a crash landing in Pakistan than fall into Indian hands. Again, when the Lahore airport refused to let the plane land, the hijackers decided that whatever the loss of their own or the hostages' lives, the plane must crashland on some road but must not turn back to Amritsar. He was only a minute or two away from a crash landing when, seeing such desperation, the Lahore tower allowed him in.

Given such a mood among the hijackers, he says, an Indian assault on the plane in Amritsar, a logical outcome of blocking it, could have cost scores of lives. Would the "experts" have preferred that? If so, they should say so out loud and prepare the country for such sacrifices in the future.

On the other hand, what was on display on all media channels was total unpreparedness of another kind, and the display probably aggravated it. The anxiety and grief of the relatives of the hostages certainly needed and deserved the display it got. It made everyone more aware than some might have been of what India is up against and must be ready for. What the authorities needed to do, failed to do, and must not neglect in future called for pointed comment, particularly their failure to provide more reassuring and comforting treatment of the relatives.

But the noisy demonstrations by them, their dharnas, the denunciation by them of everyone in any authority, added fuel to the fire, distracted attention from policy choices, put pressure on the Indian negotiators, encouraged the hijackers to step up their demands because their handlers in Pakistan knew how much pressure was building up on the Government in New Delhi. But when the relatives became quieter and said national interests could not be sacrificed, the question hung in the air what made the change and why it could not be made earlier. Clearly, despite the many hijackings India has had to face, no procedures are in place for handling such situations. They must be, soon.

Regarding the policy response at higher levels the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore had made it clear that India would either have to see scores of passengers die in a violent end to the hijacking or agree to release a few chosen militants. The PM, and some of the opposition leaders consulted by him, thought the latter would be a more humane course. But given the feverish pitch of public opinion, as reflected in the media and partly built up by them, few dared to say so in public except the former Prime Minister, I. K. Gujral, who confirmed his opinion in a speech in Meerut. The proclaimed mantra was: The passengers will return home safely and "national interest" will not be compromised.

Fortunately this circle was squared in Kandahar. All hostages came home (barring a most unfortunate fatality earlier on), and there is not much reason why the release of the three militants should fuel the vigour of the militants or depress the morale of the security forces any more than the reverse happened when the three were arrested.

But there is no reason why another gain which was within our reach in Kandahar should have been allowed to slip through our fingers while the government tried to appease the same domestic cacophony. For the first time in a decade a window opened between India's abiding interests in Afghanistan and the authorities in charge over there, and without whose help the safe return of the hostages would have been a lot more difficult. For every one voice in India that appreciated this help there were ten which complained the Taliban did not do more (some even said it should have handed the hijackers over to us!), forgetting that for years we have been hostile to the Taliban and friendly with its toughest enemies, America and Ahmed Shah Masood.

This is not to suggest that we should shut our diplomatic eyes and get cozy with Kabul. We have also to look to our relations with Russia (and with Iran, though it has recently re-opened its border with Kabul). But there is no reason why we should not have used the window to survey future opportunities before we shut out the view with our untimely and unnecessary complaining.

By arrangement with The Hindu of India.