Once Beaten, Twice Shy

Backdrop in Sri Lanka seems moderately set for a likely peace deal between the government and the LTTE. If past experience is any guide, the photo-finish could be defective. Ekram Kabir explains why

IF Sri Lanka needs anything desperately, then it is peace. It needs to end the 16-year ethnic war in the country's north. The war-torn island has been drifting for too long with many failed attempts for peace. Any fresh initiative to break the deadlock with the LTTE has to be considered with prudence. This is precisely the reality that surfaced when President Chandrika Kumaratunga was re-elected for the second time in December 21 election amid hopes to resolve the crisis. But things seem complex in Colombo.

There, however, seemed to have been no chance for dialogue immediately after President Chandrika Kumaratunga's re-election. Evidently, she was the last person whom both the opposition United National Party (UNP) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wanted as president. Although she had a tough race, yet she won. Securing 51.12 per cent of the popular mandate, she won a handsome lead over Ranil Wickremasinghe - her main challenger and Leader of the Opposition, who got 42.71 per cent of the vote. This, however, was lower than the 62 per cent of votes she received in 1994. Thirteen candidates have joined the presidential race in Sri Lanka, but the contest was only between Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe. The campaign was marked by the signals the two leaders sent to the masses and the implications of their vote-catching slogans on the island's future political course. An issue that dominated the political agenda of the two main rivals was the resolution of the ethnic conflict.

Kumaratunga's anti-incumbency factor - propagated by her rivals - has played the key role in ensuring her victory. Like The Hindu of India editorially stated immediately after the election that "even if a number of Tamils may not have voted for the president in her re-election bid, she remains their best bet to usher in an era of peace offering, as she has, the first non-chauvinist dispensation in Sri Lanka." This, however, leads to her flunked commitments she had shown following her previous electoral victory in 1995 to find a political solution to the ethnic issue. Actually at that time, very little had been achieved in the way of peace, and there was more chaos than reconciliation. A mega show was also unveiled in 1994-5 when she won a landslide victory in the presidential race on peace plank. After several rounds of talks, the official delegation could make no headway with the LTTE and the negotiations never achieved anything. There was an exchange of letters between Kumaratunga and LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran. The talks finally collapsed and another instalment of Eelam war was launched in April 1995.

In the current initiative, Kumaratunga by and large exudes confidence, among the people of the island - 74 per cent Singhalese, 12 per cent Sri Lankan Tamils, 6 per cent Indian Tamils, 7 per cent Muslims and one per cent others. She called upon Wickremasinghe to "join this government" and "honour the commitment" given during the election campaign "to this nation's peace, without compromising in any way with those who attempt to sow terror for narrow political gains."

The post-poll reaction of the UNP has been of some comfort. While dismissing the possibility of joining the government as "very unlikely", the UNP said that it would consider providing "outside support" on specific issues in order to end the conflict. Also apparent in the UNP's response was its perception that there was an imminent threat from the LTTE to the island's political leadership. Wickremasinghe told the press that as long as the recent bomb scare continued, the threat would remain. There is, however, a growing realisation among the main political parties that pursuing a line of mutual opposition on national issues would be futile. The future of Sri Lanka's polity largely depends on translating this realisation into policy and action. Kumaratunga would do better if she pays heed to this and renew her call to the opposition political parties. So, any dialogue with the LTTE should be preceded by a Sinhala consensus so that the issues of war and peace are not subjected to the vagaries of competitive Sinhala politics. In the present scenario, consensus means the support of 94 per cent of the Sri Lankan population.

Colombo has been contemplating to go farther than the devolution proposals, and new ideas such as asymmetrical devolution was being explored. Consequently, the merits of having an international mediator are being seriously considered. The Norwegians are in Colombo to help speed up a dialogue. Certainly no government will extend support to the idea of a separate Eelam. International isolation of the LTTE, except from the Tamils living abroad, is a reality today. The mediator may use his good offices in finalising an agreement; the mediator should also ensure that the agreement is implemented in right earnest. Considering what the LTTE is capable of doing, former director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, who was also a member of the International Observer Group for the Sri Lankan presidential election, is worth quoting: "A major impediment to peace continues to be the intransigence of Prabhakaran. His record makes it clear that he will use the interval between negotiations to build up his strength". According to Sri Lankan Government representatives at earlier negotiations, the LTTE "would drag on and on" and put forward new conditions for the return to normalcy. There were no serious talks about a political settlement. In order to pre-empt such a possibility, the LTTE should be persuaded to spell out the details of a "viable alternative". Will this be embarking on another futile exercise which Colombo can ill afford?

Again the President should realise that any third party mediation is no magic wand to the problem. Sri Lanka had India as a third party mediator doing little to contain the northern terrorism and even militarily intervening in Sri Lanka against the wishes of the Sri Lankan government. And the terrorists soon turned their guns on the latter. If a third party or "facilitator" is brought in, there has to be an agenda for mediation. Past negotiations with the LTTE without a specific agenda has floundered.

Kumaratunga government, accompanying the opposition, should ask the LTTE what their basic demands are, if negotiations are to take place at all. If they want a confederation of two states - one step short of a separate state - then any form of negotiation will be futile. The Tigers, on their part, have maintained that they would not insist on Tamil Eelam if a "viable alternative" is offered. The LTTE had been in touch with a number of concerned persons and organisations, such as British parliamentarians, the Commonwealth secretary-general and the Norwegian government. At the Heroes Day ceremony last year, say the wire agencies, Prabhakaran spelt out the preconditions for peace talks: "Peace talks should be held in a cordial, peaceful atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill with the assistance of international third party mediation."

Understandably, Prabhakaran was waiting for the outcome of the election and the likely response of the new government.

Now with the election behind her and another outbreak of violence, Kumaratunga must have wondered when to call parliamentary elections. However, in her address after assuming office, she gave two clear messages to the LTTE and its supporters one of which sounded like a warning. She appeared more determined than ever to bring peace to the troubled island and she said: "The days of terror are numbered, and that number is small." Simultaneously, she also appealed to the LTTE cadres to exert pressure on their leader, V Prabhakaran, to "renounce violence and join us in establishing peace".

There certainly is an element of determination to end the 16-year ethnic war in the north, yet, say Sri Lanka observers, Kumaratunga needs much more effort than this. In 1994, there was a cross-community backing for Kumaratunga's candidature as there was an island-wide euphoria in favour of peace. The response was particularly high in the northeastern area. Then there was an overall sense of dismay and cynicism - weeks ahead of the 1999 election - over the polity and the approach of the political players to the issues confronting the nation. President Kumaratunga should pay attention to the grievances.