Still Drifting

TO SAY that the India-Pakistan relationship is at its lowest ebb since 1971 is to stress the obvious. One wishes one could be optimistic about the prospects of a serious move to stop the drift, if not to repair the damage. In this situation, it is hard to be clear how the two sides would conduct themselves, except to discount the highly alarmist interpretations by a section of foreign diplomats - and, at their instance, by their respective governments. Such a reading emanates from the theory, often propounded in most industrial capitals, describing South Asia as a flash point. In practice, there are quite a few checks and balances, not excluding the nuclear status of the two sides.

There is no mistaking the factors that have strained the bilateral ties, as never before in nearly three decades - one, Kargil, two, the aftermath of the coup in Islamabad, and now the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane. The deadly mix of the three has claimed a heavy toll and a respite does not seem in sight, what with the increasing level of militancy and trans-border terrorism continuously hardening the mood in India, both at the official and non-official levels. In Pakistan, the outcome of the hijacking is seen as having undone the humiliation caused by the retreat in Kargil and the mood is upbeat.

At this stage, one could only mention a likely case scenario for the near future. There will be varied manifestations of strong pressures in each country. In India, as is already evident, the government would be faced with the twin challenge of stepped-up terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, as reflected by daring attacks on the security forces, paramilitary and police personnel, and the post-hijacking problems, especially the formulation of a strategy to ensure against recurrence of such tragedies.

To build world opinion against trans-border violence, New Delhi has called upon major powers to declare Pakistan a terrorist State.

This is to be seen as a sign of exasperation rather than a practical proposition. The U.S., perhaps the only country where the national legislation provides for sanctions and embargoes against states determined as "terrorist", has made it know that the present situation arising from the activities of the organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Ansar (now called Harkat- ul-Mujahideen), need to be tackled differently. New Delhi, however, may keep up the pressure, calling upon Washington to deal suitably with the Pakistan-based elements, designated by it as "foreign terrorists". More important, it will be under pressure to plan tougher measures to deal with the new reality, the increased militancy. The non-official opinion would require the government to add teeth to its response, making use of the advantages that accrue to the country of the size and with the resources of India, with its strategic location. (These suggestions are not to be confused with calls for extreme steps, which are confined to fringe elements).

In Pakistan, there is already a change in the official priority in the matter of dealings with India. Kashmir first, and other issues later - is the line of the military regime. More of it may be heard in the days to come, investing the rhetoric from Pakistan with a new ominous ring. The likes of the HuM would plan new terrorist activities - with the help of intelligence agencies in the belief that they were close to the "final blow". At the official level, the new deterioration of the bilateral ties would be seen in a renewed bid to internationalise the Kashmir issue. In this mood in the two countries, any meaningful contact would be a major casualty.

A less likely case scenario. If Islamabad were to spell out a reasonable vision of dealing with India, New Delhi may find it hard to continue the present line - of refraining from doing substantive business with the military regime. The contactlessness may give place to contacts, even though uneasy.

The contrast in the dealings of the two countries at the beginning of last year and at the present juncture could not have been sharper. The year 1999 started on a promising note, what with the two prime ministers, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, seeking to build upon their personal rapport, to take concrete steps to reverse the adversarial trends. The much-hailed bus diplomacy produced the Lahore Declaration with its framework for negotiations and the memorandum of understanding, re-defining their relationship as nuclear powers.

The euphoria was short-lived, as the massive intrusion of Pakistani troops into Kargil and the subsequent armed conflict washed away the gains, so painstakingly achieved. New Delhi felt cheated by the betrayal of the trust reposed in Islamabad. The thought that Pakistan's armed forces were busy planning the Kargil misadventure when their Prime Minister was swearing by the peace agenda produced bitter disenchantment. New Delhi, it was clear, would be highly wary in its response to any fresh move for a dialogue. But despite the changed posture, the resumption of talks was not ruled out. Another blow was administered when the democratic government was dismissed in October last year and Pakistan once again found itself under military rule led by the Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, widely perceived here as the architect of the Kargil operation. New Delhi made no secret of its stand - to confine the dealings with Islamabad to the working level. The hijacking, master-minded as it was by Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, infuriated India. It completed the dissimilarity between the situation now and 12 months ago.

The change of Government in Islamabad put an end to the back-channel diplomacy, of which we first heard during the Kargil conflict. Going by the details available now, it was initiated soon after the Lahore bus journey - in pursuance of the decision of the two Prime Ministers. Islamabad nominated a senior retired bureaucrat but, because of his death, the job was entrusted to a former diplomat, Niaz Naik. He and his opposite number from India, R. K. Mishra, a journalist, met several times till their mission was interrupted by the Kargil crisis.

Proceeding on the basis that Ladakh and Jammu remain in India, they were stated to have discussed various formulae to deal with the valley (all of which treated "Azad" Kashmir as part of Pakistan). They delved into the records of the marathon rounds in the distant past between Swaran Singh and Z. A. Bhutto, then in charge of their respective foreign offices, and talked about the various ideas mooted then.

It turned out that the division of the valley on the basis of the present LoC (with slight changes) was not acceptable to Pakistan while India was not agreeable to a new dividing line, along a specified river. Also figuring in this informal interaction was the proposal by a Kashmir study group, seeking to marry the concept of two sovereignties (of India and Pakistan, in the areas under their respective control) with maximum autonomy for the two parts.

Kargil disturbed the back-channel contact but did not scuttle it. Both Mishra and Naik shuttled between the two capitals, with the immediate agenda - to bring an end to the fighting. An agreed basis, however, could not be found.

The coup in Pakistan did scuttle that process. In the new situation, where the Lahore process was downgraded, it was not hard to imagine the fate of the informal discussions. But those who thought that Naik would be on the wrong side of the new regime because of his role in secret talks and also because of his public comments, involving him in an unsavoury controversy with the army (before the coup), may have to revise their opinion. Naik attended a prestigious seminar in Kathmandu early last month as part of an 11-member team from Pakistan and strongly pleaded with the Indian participants in the seminar for New Delhi's dealings with Gen. Musharraf. The military rulers would not have let him go to Kathmandu, if he had fallen from grace. Had the hijacking not intervened, would the two sides have moved towards resumption of contacts? One guess is as good as another.