It's Pak carnage with US supply

Less than two weeks before Bangladesh's Independence, the then US President Richard Nixon had called Henry A Kissinger twice on December 4, 1971, asking if warplanes had been sent to Pakistan.

“Did the Jordans [Jordanians] send [the] planes?” Nixon asked his National Security Adviser Kissinger in a second round of conversation that started at 12:15pm.

“17”, replied Kissinger.

Pakistan President Yahya Khan had “urgently” appealed to Jordan for a number of warplanes in the wake of the US congress amending the Foreign Assistance Act at the end of July to prevent the administration from giving Pakistan military assistance.

The US did not want to provide Pakistan with military assistance even under the “one-time exception” policy it had made in October 1970.

 At that time the Jordanian military had a fleet of US-made Lockheed F-104 starfighters.

Nonetheless, Nixon and Kissinger continued to exert their influence to get military and economic assistance for Pakistan.

Nixon did it for an obvious reason as US Senator Case put it in a question, “Did the US make any commitment to Pakistan on military assistance in connection with the arrangement for your [Nixon's] visit to Peking?”

The senator was quoted by National Security Council staff Harold H Saunders on his memo on “Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking” for Kissinger on July 19, 1971. The diplomatic relations of the US with China had been cut off for 25 years then.

Nixon successfully turned the Bangladesh war into an opportunity for the US to resume diplomatic relations with China.

Supporting Pakistan in the war provided Kissinger and Chinese Ambassador in Paris Huang Chan with a solid ground to initiate their discussion at their meeting on August 16. The meeting was arranged to schedule separate visits for Nixon and Kissinger to China.

 “We are prevented by congress from giving military assistance but we understand it if other friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment they need,” Kissinger told Chan.  

“Indian skilful propaganda” made “it next to impossible to continue military supply to Pakistan”, Kissinger continued.

“I told Huang that we would understand the furnishing of military equipment by the PRC [People's Republic of China] to Pakistan [they are doing it anyway].” Kissinger reported to Nixon about the meeting.

Kissinger also shared with Nixon Chan's view of India as “obviously interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan and is carrying out subversive actions”.

The Paris meeting occurred over a month after Kissinger visited New Delhi on July 7, 1971.

“With [Indian] Foreign Minister Singh [Swaran Singh], I began the conversation by saying I felt I owed him as a point of honour an explanation of developments in regard to arms shipments for Pakistan since his visit to Washington,” reported Kissinger about his visit to Daniel J Murphy, military assistant to the secretary of defence.

Kissinger did meet Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. “I took the same general line on India's importance without going into as much detail on the arms shipments,” he reported.

It is, perhaps, because of his awareness of the letter Gandhi had written to Nixon on August 9.

“Our government is greatly embarrassed that soon after our foreign minister's return from his Washington visit and despite the statements made by ambassador Keating in Bombay on April 16th and by the state departments spokesman on April 15th came the news of fresh supplies of US arms to Pakistan,” wrote Indira Gandhi.

Since the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the US refused to “supply or to license the export of lethal end-items for Pakistan” until “the so-called one-time exception” policy was made just ahead of 1971 war, in October 1970.

Under the exception, the US agreed to supply Pakistan with “300 armoured personnel carriers and approximately 20 aircraft”.

This arms dealing was dubbed “State Department's deception” by some US congress members.

Kissinger's memo on “Policy Options Toward Pakistan” for Nixon, prepared on April 28, 1971, was a proof. His first option was “Supporting whatever political and military program President Yahya chooses to pursue in the East”.

The second option was “On military assistance, we would have to defer all deliveries of ammunition, death-dealing equipment and spare parts…”.

Still, Kissinger asserted, “Our military supply, while relatively small and unlikely to affect the outcome of the fighting, is an important symbolic element in our posture.”

The symbolic element did have a “selective genocidal” impact on the people of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), according to a March 29, 1971, telegram sent by Archer Kent Blood, then US consul general in Dhaka.

“Appalled At Possibility These Atrocities Are Being Committed With American Equipment,” the telegram's first few sentences included.

Two days later, on March 31, in another cable titled “Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca…”, Blood reported seeing “Two F-86's” taking off in the direction of Pabna following an Army Radio broadcast of Pakistani military facing some resistance there”. 

The F-86, known as North American Sabre, is best known as the United States' first swept wing fighter.

However, the quantity of war weapons the US had supplied to the Pakistan military could not be known.

Still, on July 7, over lunch with “high level” dignitaries in New Delhi, Kissinger expressed his belief, “…$20 million of arms shipments…” “…would be forgotten in a couple of years.”