‘Karnaphuli tunnel is a white elephant for Bangladesh’
What prompted the Bangladesh Bridge Authority (BBA) to undertake the Karnaphuli tunnel project?
The Karnaphuli tunnel project was, frankly, a decision taken on a whim. The bridges authority moved forward without a proper feasibility study. We already had a bridge over the Karnaphuli River—the Shah Amanat Bridge—so the argument was that a second bridge would create congestion and disrupt the river flow due to the gathering of silt around bridge pillars. Thus, the decision to build a tunnel was made to avoid these issues, with much hype about it being South Asia's first underwater tunnel. But the decision wasn't well-thought-out or technically sound. The ambition of being the first at something outshined the need for the conversation about feasibility.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. Why do you think there are challenges in bridge construction in Bangladesh?
Bangladesh has yet to master modern bridge construction. Most of our bridges are built with short spans and many pillars, which isn't ideal. This results in structures that interfere with river navigation, especially as vessel sizes and river traffic increase. In countries like Vietnam, bridges are constructed with spans exceeding a kilometre. Here, however, even major bridges like the Padma and Jamuna bridges have spans of only 150 to 200 metres. This limits clearance, hinders river traffic, and reflects the outdated design. It's almost impossible to call these structures "modern bridges" in the 21st century.
What are the specific advantages of bridges over tunnels in a river environment like the Karnaphuli?
Bridges are advantageous because they use natural elements, making them more sustainable and easier to maintain. For example, a bridge benefits from natural ventilation, sunlight, and rain drainage, reducing the need for energy-intensive maintenance. If a bridge gets wet, rainwater drains off naturally, while exhaust disperses into the open air. Tunnels, however, require constant maintenance for ventilation systems, lighting, drainage, and emergency firefighting equipment, among other things, which is also costly. Essentially, a tunnel is on life support from day one. The need for artificial lighting, ventilation, and drainage makes it far more resource-intensive than a bridge.
When tunnels were built in the past, there was less emphasis on sustainable development, but that has changed. Now, everyone is focused on green development with minimal carbon footprints. The Karnaphuli tunnel, however, runs contrary to this goal, which is why it's so costly and difficult to maintain. In fact, its operation is causing us a daily loss of Tk 27 lakh. It is akin to being a "white elephant" for the country.
Was there sufficient planning for the tunnel's long-term maintenance and revenue generation?
No. A tunnel requires continuous ventilation, lighting, and firefighting measures. Moreover, the revenue potential is limited due to certain vehicle restrictions. For example, vehicles carrying hazardous materials or those powered by CNG are not allowed to enter, which narrows its use. This decision makes the tunnel less accessible, which impacts revenue.
On top of this, toll rates for the tunnel are much higher than those for the Shah Amanat Bridge, which deters many vehicles, particularly commercial ones, from using it. Private cars, which don't generate substantial revenue, may still use it, but commercial vehicles will seek cheaper alternatives. This combination of high maintenance and limited revenue doesn't bode well for the tunnel's future.
Why are bridges considered more efficient for revenue collection, and how does the Karnaphuli tunnel fare in comparison?
Typically, tolls from commercial vehicles like buses and trucks drive revenue for infrastructure projects like this. These vehicles prefer routes that are both affordable and accessible. Here, the high toll and restrictions on certain vehicle types reduce the tunnel's attractiveness and revenue potential. Since it was costly to construct and is expensive to maintain, the toll rate is considerably high—up to five times more than other options. But with a cheaper, parallel alternative, many commercial vehicles will likely avoid the tunnel, which further reduces its revenue-earning.
Was there any oversight of the planning and feasibility studies for this project?
There appears to have been limited accountability in the project's planning stages. Those conducting the feasibility study approached it as a formality. A consulting company was hired, but the process was minimal. Consequently, the projected traffic figures fell far short of reality. Since the consultants are third-party contractors, they simply completed the report, collected their fee, and left. Neither the BBA nor the consultancy firm is being held accountable for this shortfall, despite the substantial use of public funds. Ideally, action should be taken against these lapses to ensure better practices in the future.
Was the idea of building a "twin city" around the tunnel realistically considered?
The notion that this tunnel would enable a "twin city" across the river is overly simplistic. We have seen no such development even with long-established bridges, such as the Jamuna Bridge. In other countries, twin cities are built around integrated road networks and thoughtfully planned infrastructure on both riverbanks. Creating a twin city requires much more than just building a tunnel or bridge; it demands accessible transport systems for all types of vehicles, including pedestrians, cyclists, and local modes of transport.
However, such plans need close collaboration between the BBA and the Chattogram Development Authority to create cohesive urban development. This coordination is absent, and without it, the idea of a twin city remains just a vision.
What further planning and coordination issues have you observed in the tunnel project, and what could be improved in future projects?
There were various critical oversights in planning this project. For one, the bridge authority doesn't have a dedicated planning or research department, so they have always relied on external consultants rather than building internal expertise. It also treats these infrastructure projects as isolated tasks rather than as part of a larger transportation network. For instance, even when a bridge or tunnel is completed, the approach roads are often still under construction, which makes them inefficient. Ideally, approach and exit roads should be part of the planning from the beginning, with consideration given to traffic flow, multiple access points, and connections with other transport systems. For future projects, Bangladesh needs to consider sustainable, long-term solutions that integrate bridges or tunnels with other infrastructure. This may mean consulting international experts in infrastructure planning or sustainable development. As a small, densely populated country, Bangladesh has limited resources and land, so every development must be three times more efficient and carefully planned. Sustainable development should be the guiding principle.
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