July crackdown was ‘a political decision’

Former inspector general of police Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun has said that most of the decisions made to suppress the July uprising came from political high-ups, including the prime minister herself.

He said this in a confessional statement to a Dhaka magistrate on March 24.

Mamun is now behind bars in a case filed against him over crimes against humanity during the July movement. Former prime minister Sheikh Hasina and ex-home minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal are his co-accused.

He was made an approver upon his request on July 10.

In a legal context, an "approver" is someone who was involved in a crime but, in exchange for a reduced sentence or pardon, confesses their guilt and provides testimony against their accomplices.

In his statement, Mamun said regular meetings of a "core committee" were held at Asaduzzaman's house almost every night around 8:00-9:00pm from July 19, 2024, onwards to suppress the uprising.

Dhaka Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Md Zakir Hossain recorded the statement. This newspaper saw a copy of the statement from a source at the International Crimes Tribunal yesterday.

"As a member of that committee, I was present at those meetings. Attendees included home secretary Jahangir, additional secretary [Political] Tipu Sultan, additional secretary Reza Mostafa, SB [special branch of police] chief Monirul Islam, DB [detective branch of police] chief Harun-Or-Rashid, RAB DG [director general] Barrister Harunur Rashid, DMP [Dhaka Metropolitan Police] commissioner Habibur, Border Guard Bangladesh DG Major General Ashrafuzzaman Siddique, Ansar DG Major General AKM Aminul Haque, NTMC [National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre] DG Major General Ziaul Ahsan, and DGFI chief."

The meeting discussed the movement, and various government directives and recommendations by Asaduzzaman.

"At one meeting, it was decided to arrest the coordinators of the movement. DB chief Harun and DGFI were tasked with making the arrests. The [six] coordinators were detained and held in DB custody, subjected to mental pressure and threats to coerce a compromise with the government.

"Family members were also brought in. The detainees were forced to make statements on television announcing the withdrawal of the movement. I opposed the arrests at the committee meeting, but they were carried out following the home minister's directive," Mamun said.

DG chief Harun had a very close relationship with Asaduzzaman Khan, who used to call Harun "Jinn" (spirit) and regarded him as highly efficient and politically effective in implementing government decisions.

Outside the official meetings, several police officials, OCs, NTMC's Ziaul Ahsan, DGs of DGFI and NSI (National Security Intelligence), and officials of various ranks regularly met Asaduzzaman.

"At one stage, a secret plan was made to monitor, shoot at protesters, and create a climate of fear around the movement using helicopters. I later learned that the operation was conducted using helicopters under the planning of Rab DG Harunur Rashid and with the support of the military. However, as the IGP, I was not involved in this operation. The deployment of helicopters was essentially a political decision."

Mamun also said that to suppress the movement, a direct political decision was later made to use lethal weapons and conduct block raids in protest-prone areas.

"I was informed by home minister Asaduzzaman that under the directive of prime minister Sheikh Hasina, the decision to use lethal weapons to quell the movement was taken. At that time, additional DIG of Police Headquarters Proloy Kumar Joarder was present in front of me. Through him [Proloy], the then DMP commissioner and other police officials at various levels came to know of the directive."

Additionally, then DMP commissioner Habibur had direct communication with Asaduzzaman. "Both Habibur and DB chief Harun were overly enthusiastic about using lethal weapons."

In his statement, Mamun added that the home minister was determined to suppress the movement by any means. "On July 18, DMP commissioner Habib publicly ordered the use of Chinese rifles to fire upon protesters."

The then law minister Anisul Huq, Dhaka South City Corporation mayor Fazle Noor Taposh, prime minister's adviser Salman F Rahman, Awami League general secretary Obaidul Quader, Jahangir Kabir Nanak, Mirza Azam, state minister for information and broadcasting Md Ali Arafat, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal general secretary Hasanul Haq Inu, and Workers Party's Rashed Khan Menon all advised and incited the prime minister to eliminate the student-people movement using lethal weapons, he added.

"Even after so many people were killed across the country, they did not stop their incitement or ask the prime minister to stop the violence."

He said that on July 17, Chhatra League carried out a brutal attack on students at Dhaka University.

"The police did not play a proper role there. Essentially, they acted under the instructions of DMP commissioner Habibur. Leaders like Obaidul Quader and Nanak unleashed Chhatra League upon the students. Rab, the military, and other forces were deployed under the directives of the prime minister and home minister …. and many people were killed or injured through the use of helicopters and lethal firearms."

Additionally, Awami League-affiliated intellectuals, journalists, and police officers were all eager to misguide the government and brutally suppress the movement, he said.

On August 4 last year, then law minister Anisul, home minister Asaduzzaman, chiefs of three armed forces, and members of the National Security Committee met with Hasina at the Gono Bhaban around 11:00am.

"The meeting focused on the movement and strategies to suppress it. Intelligence reports indicated that the movement had reached a critical stage and needed to be quelled. There was no discussion about regime change.

"We tried to present accurate information to the government, but it was unwilling to acknowledge its weaknesses. As the situation deteriorated fast across various locations, the meeting was adjourned."

At 10:00pm that night, Hasina convened another meeting at the Gono Bhaban, where her sister Sheikh Rehana, Asaduzzaman, Anisul, chiefs of the three armed forces, the Rab DG, and he himself as the IGP were present.

"SB chief Monirul and the DGFI DG were sitting outside while Maj Gen Mujib [director general of Special Security Force] attended the meeting …. The discussions were candid, focusing on how to suppress the planned mass gathering on August 5. Deployment of forces was discussed in detail. The meeting lasted about 30–45 minutes.

"Afterward, we moved to the military's operations control room. Chiefs of three forces, Maj Gen Mujib, Rab DG, intelligence officials, DMP commissioner Habibur, and I were present there. There, we discussed force deployment. The meeting concluded around 12:30am. It was decided that strict control would be enforced at entry points to Dhaka city. No detailed plan was finalised, but it was agreed that police would coordinate with the military."

Mamun further said, "On August 5, 2024, until 10:00am, we [the police] maintained a strong position inside Dhaka. At the entry points, in areas like Uttara and Jatrabari, hundreds of thousands gathered. At that time, I was stationed at Police Headquarters. The DMP commissioner and other senior police officials of Dhaka were present at the police control room, issuing directives from there."

He said that around 11:00am, hundreds of thousands of people began entering Dhaka from Uttara.

"It was then that I learned that the army did not obstruct them. Field-level officers of the army took a stance in favour of the movement. As a result, it was not possible to block the flow of people heading toward the Gono Bhaban."

By 1:00 pm, the streets of Dhaka were taken over by protesters.

"We were instructed by the PMO to block the crowds in the Mohakhali area. Between 12:30–1:00pm, I realised the government would fall. I was informed through SB that the prime minister would relinquish power. I didn't know she would go to India. The army didn't disclose that."

That afternoon, Mamun was informed about a helicopter arriving at the Police Headquarters to evacuate officers. He boarded it and went to Tejgaon Airport. From there, he took refuge at the Army Officers' Mess.

He said he was later arrested in several cases. "Owing to my service in critical government and law enforcement roles, I became involved in many matters of national importance.

BEFORE JULY 2024

In his tell-all statement, he further said that at least 50 percent of the ballots were stuffed the night before the 2018 election day, after the then inspector general of police Javed Patwary advised Hasina in this regard.

During the 2018 election, Mamun was serving as deputy inspector general of Dhaka Range.

"As part of my personal respect towards the July uprising and driven by conscience, I have voluntarily decided to provide this statement."

He said orders were allegedly issued to field-level authorities to support the ballot stuffing process.

"With the involvement of political leaders, district administration officials, including deputy commissioners, upazila nirbahi officers, assistant commissioners [land], superintendents of police and officers-in-charge, played central roles."

"Later, when selecting recipients for the Bangladesh Police Medal and President Police Medal, officers involved in electoral and political operations were favoured, compromising professionalism."

He said he was a student of Chittagong University but was never involved in Chhatra League politics. His family, however, was involved with Awami League loyalists -- his father being the Shalla upazila chairman.

"In recognition of my reputation and service to the government, I was appointed the DIG of police, chief of CID, and later as director general of RAB."

Subsequently, when conflicts and divisions emerged among Gopalganj-centric officers within the force, Hasina and Asaduzzaman appointed him as the IGP, considering his seniority, competence, and perceived neutrality, he said.

"To preserve the reputation of the police force and prevent open conflict among officers, I was later appointed IGP on a contractual basis twice."

About the divisions, he said the police force underwent extensive political polarisation since the 2014 polls, with various Gopalganj-centric factions forming within it.

He said officers at different levels became involved in political activities. As a senior officer, his ability to control the force was limited.

"Due to political connections, controversial police officers actively pursued the government's agenda, often disregarding standard laws and regulations.

"After 2018, political interference escalated. Certain officers gained considerable influence, often beyond the control of their supervisors. Meetings used to take place at night at the residence of Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, lasting until late hours."

Regular attendees included the then DMP commissioner Habibur Rahman, DB chief Harun-or-Rashid, Special Branch chief Monirul Islam, DIG Nurul Islam, DMP joint commissioner Biplob Kumar Sarkar, additional SP Kafi, and OCs Mazahar Islam, Forman Ali, and Apurba Hasan.

"These officers largely ignored directives from me or the IGP, believing they had political backing to act independently. Some had close ties with the prime minister and senior leaders. As IGP, I wanted the police to operate with professional integrity."

Officers from Gopalganj held strong influence over the force, especially at officer and OC levels. They rarely followed commands and operated according to their own will, Mamun added.

"Matters relating to them were usually handled by additional IGP Monirul Islam and commissioner Habibur Rahman. They had close connections with the home minister. Most key roles in Dhaka were held by officers from Gopalganj. A rivalry existed between Monirul Islam and commissioner Habib, each maintaining their own networks."

Claiming he had tried to fulfil his responsibilities with honesty and dedication, Mamun admitted that during the July–August movement last year, he was responsible for suppressing protests, applying excessive police force, and overseeing incidents that led to the deaths and injuries of students and civilians.

He said while serving as RAB DG between April 14, 2020, and September 30, 2022, he was aware that the Task Force Interrogation (TFI) cell operated from within the RAB-1 compound in Uttara.

Additionally, individual RAB units maintained their own cells, run by unit commanders.

Within RAB, abduction, interrogation, torture, and secret detention of dissenters were seen as standard practice. These were coordinated by the additional director general (operations) and the director of RAB intelligence.

He said he heard that serious directives, including for abductions, enforced disappearances, and crossfire killings, came directly from the Prime Minister's Office.

"During my tenure, I did not receive such orders. But I came to know that some instructions came from the prime minister's defense adviser Tarique Ahmed Siddique. Though RAB was under the IGP, the chain of command was often bypassed."

He said he tried to keep the IGP informed but wasn't always aware of who was detained or held in the TFI cell.

"I knew Barrister Arman was detained in the TFI cell, but he was not abducted during my tenure. Arman had been taken earlier.

"When DG RAB Benazir Ahmed handed over responsibilities to me, he informed me Arman was in the cell. Later, Sarwar Bin Kashem (ADG Ops and Intelligence Director) also confirmed it. The decision came from the government."

Mamun said he raised Arman's case with Tarique Siddique. "He told me, 'Keep him there. I'll tell you more later.' But he never did."

When Mamun handed over charge to Khurshid Hossain, he informed him of Arman's detention.

He added that Sarwar Bin Kashem, Khairul Islam, and Mashiur Rahman served as RAB intelligence directors during his tenure. He was aware of detainees being held without trial, tortured, or killed in crossfire.

"But I did not investigate or intervene. These decisions came from outside forces and intelligence agencies. Even as IGP, I could not take action. My words were often ignored.

"Most of RAB's operations were based on intelligence agency input. The IGP was rarely consulted."

He said he knew RAB officers Alep Uddin and Mohiuddin Faruqi. Alep, known for enforced disappearances, was preferred by many for his "skills." Most officers involved in torture were from the military.

"Matters like enforced disappearances were directly handled by Tarique Siddique through intelligence officials. Even though I was IGP, I was not informed about everything."

According to ICT officials, former IGP Javed Patwary is now a wanted accused in a case filed over crimes against humanity.

This newspaper could not reach Javed for comment yesterday despite repeated attempts.

Mamun ended his statement by saying, "As a former police chief, I am ashamed, remorseful, and seek forgiveness for the suppression of the movement under government directives; the excessive use of force by overzealous police officers and personnel, including firing on civilians, and the torture, arrest, injury; and the killings of countless people…. I am providing this statement to describe the overall situation including my role. I have given a truthful statement. This is my testimony."