Biosecurity Laws and infectious diseases

Infectious disease outbreaks have been a recurring theme in human history. The new variant of the bird flu (H5N1), facilitated by a minor change in its DNA, infecting bird species, and even humans leading to one death in Mexico. Concerns have heightened over this rapid spread of the H5N1 to domestic farm animals such as cows. A new study suggests, similar to pigs, several human-like flu receptors (proteins inside a cell or on its surface) exist in different parts of the cow body (cow udders in particular), which also contains bird receptors, multiplying the possibility of cows further spreading the virus. Global biosafety concerns are further exacerbated by the new variant of the monkeypox (mpox) Virus spreading in multiple countries across Africa, Europe, and Asia, prompting the WHO to declare it a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).

What implication do these newer, and possibly more infectious variants of the bird flu & mpox have for Bangladesh? For a country such as Bangladesh with a large poultry industry, low health security, and an economy still recovering from a global pandemic, the emergence of both these diseases is extremely concerning. Legislative measures are exceptionally useful in the standardisation of both proactive and reactive measures to infectious disease outbreaks. The question that needs to be asked and answered, is whether the laws of Bangladesh addressing biosecurity are up to the task. This piece provides an overview of the laws of Bangladesh addressing biosafety and their efficacy.

For starters, Bangladesh has both international treaty obligation (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights outlining state party duty to handle epidemics or endemics) and constitutional obligation (under article 18 of the Constitution concerning state duty to improve public health) to prevent, control, and eradicate infectious disease outbreaks. There are a number of laws in Bangladesh that could be useful to thwart these new strains of the bird flu and mpox, and to prevent the possibility of any kind of animal-to-human transmission or widescale outbreak.

The Animal Diseases Act 2005 (sections 3-12, 14, 15) provides a wide range of reactionary measures to be undertaken in the event of a suspected or ascertained disease outbreak including isolation of infected animals, burying of animals dead or suspected to be so from an infectious disease, reporting obligation, lockdown of infected area, and prohibition of marketisation of infected animals or their products. The Quarantine of Animal and Animal Products Act 2005 empowers the Government of Bangladesh to restrict the entrance, import/export of animals infected or potentially exposed to an infectious disease, including their disinfection, isolation, quarantine, and the period of such separation (sections 3, 5-7). The Food Safety Act 2013, additionally prohibits the production, import, or marketing of diseased or decomposed food (section 34). The Animal Slaughter and Meat Standard Regulation Act 2011 enables a veterinary official or veterinarian to determine if the carcass of a slaughtered animal is inedible, either wholly or partially, to ensure its non-introduction into the food chain (sections 17-19). The 2018 Act establishing the Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute mandates it to conduct epidemiological research on livestock diseases, biosafety for zoonotic and transboundary animal diseases, and to establish health protocols or guidelines for protection (section 10).

In addition, the Infectious Disease (Prevention, Control, and Eradication) Act 2018 recognises an expansive number of diseases within its ambit including the avian flu (section 4). This Act outlines isolation, quarantine measures for infected individuals, the burial of bodies dead from or suspected to be so from infection, reporting obligations, and the requirement of containment measures to conform with WHO and IHR 2005 guidelines (sections 5, 9-14, 16-20, & 24).

Thus, Bangladesh has an extensive legal framework addressing infectious disease outbreaks. The framework is, however, at present, inchoate. The majority of the laws addressing biosecurity are mostly reactionary. Very few of the provisions actually establish a proactive framework that builds up the capacity of ground-level personnel and institutions including the efficiency of the overall organisational framework. Moreover, the eight laws covered in this piece have no cohesion within them and are at best standalone pieces of legislation. Furthermore, the laws in and of themselves do not address the tremendous financial toll associated with the prevention, mitigation, and eradication of an infectious disease outbreak.

Laws are a crucial instrument in dealing with a pathogen. They, however, are not an all-purpose solution. What is needed is infrastructural enhancement in tandem with the prevention and mitigation frameworks developed by the laws. Nita Madhav et al. (2017) suggests a framework for an ingrained understanding of the conditions that lead to the emergence and spread of a pathogen, its impact on population health, the costs associated with implementing protocols to prevent further spread, and the recovery of infected individuals. 

The possibility of the H5N1 infecting livestock and jumping species barrier is a concerning matter for the livestock and agricultural industry in Bangladesh. A reassuring factor about the new mpox variant is that, unlike COVID-19, it is not airborne, and only spreads through direct contact or exchange of bodily fluids. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the population density, and resource-deprived state of healthcare infrastructure in Bangladesh, there is an urgent need to adopt a more coherent approach in the form of a comprehensive policy-legal framework to address its biosecurity concerns instead of the existing legislation-specific piecemeal approach.

The writer is LL.M. Candidate, Peter A. Allard School of Law, the University of British Columbia.