Education, identity and ideology: Bangladesh's struggle for unity
Years of neglect and underinvestment in education have conditioned the societal meltdown that we are experiencing today. Unplanned growth of alternative educational systems, such as madrasa, happened in an effort to fill the void left by public institutions. This, among other things, contributed to societal fragmentation even as it fostered the promotion of divergent ideological perspectives. In a way, the three-pronged education—Bangla, English, and madrasa—does our youth a disservice, as evidenced by the social, cultural, economic and political battles we are seeing.
The fight against the former regime began over a discriminatory percentage of job allocation. Students from all three groups came together, shouldered with the common mass, sacrificed their lives, and stood in solidarity seeking a systemic reform. Now that the regime change has happened, harsh realities are hitting the surface. Imagine: nearly 19 lakh graduates who completed their education in the last three years are unable to find jobs. While the situation exposes the gap between our education system and industry, it also calls for a review of the system that failed to prepare our graduates for a competitive job market. A recent attempt to reform the curriculum encountered difficulties when the commission formed to oversee the changes came under scrutiny for their ideological beliefs. The government disbanded the commission as some members were accused of supporting secularism and endorsing personal freedoms by some hardline religious elements. It signals an emerging ideological clash, which may hamper the reform process. For the incumbent government, problems run like a motorcycle in a circus iron cage. As members in the crowd, we see movement and hear noises, but nothing seems to change.
But the incident highlighted the gap between our secular education system and the growing influence of religious elements. Mahfuj Alam, the young special assistant to the chief adviser, recently spoke to Prothom Alo, where he claimed that the visible Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh's culture and politics is not an isolated event—it is part of a deeper, unresolved ideological struggle that dates back to the 1947 Partition. Leaders have historically used both religion and Bangalee nationalism to serve various political purposes, creating a complex interplay between identity and power. The push for a homeland for Bangalee Muslims during Partition proved to be short-lived, as it became clear that our cultural identity was fundamentally different from those in Pakistan. Following the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the focus shifted towards language and ethnicity, with secularism, nationalism, socialism and democracy becoming the guiding principles of the new nation.
Yet, for many who fought in the war from an existential perspective, these principles left unresolved questions about the role of religion for a Bangalee Muslim. Mahfuj points out that this ideological split allowed various groups to politicise religion in ways that continue to divide the nation today. The inability to engage the masses in a unified educational framework has fuelled resentment and created fertile ground for alternative institutions to thrive.
Referring to a question on the rise of Islamists, Mahfuj characterised it as a return of the repressed. "Resentment can make people become reactionary," he said. "A large part of our ruling class had a secular identity, but they were never in a secular structure. How does a poor boy grow up in society? The state does not feed him; the orphanage does."
According to Mahfuj, the ruling class ignored the vast majority in the villages. "There has not been any dialogue with this large group." No one ever discussed the cherry-picking of Hason Raja or Lalon without properly understanding how these societal figures came to such a humanitarian understanding. People portrayed them as stately figures without understanding their societal evolution.
"The villagers perceive Dhaka as the state. They know that no one will give them anything. They made their own arrangements. They have created their own political culture. If someone goes there wearing modern clothes, they become a victim of suspicion and hatred. Because the villager's boundaries are set, you can't do what you want in Dhaka."
Mahfuj's reputation as "the mastermind" behind the student-led mass uprising that precipitated the fall of the previous regime signals the policy direction of the interim government. The masses chose Dr Muhammad Yunus to not only pull the country out of the crisis, but also repair the country's damaged image before a global audience. Dr Yunus told the Voice of America that the young revolutionaries had pressed the reset button to make a fresh start. Mahfuj's interview is therefore crucial as it helps us trace the ideological contour of this government.
Mahfuj describes the 2024 uprising as an opportunity to return to the original desires of the deprived and persecuted masses of 1971. For him, an "ideological trap" was created in 1972 that did not answer the questions of 1971 and oversimplified secularism to overshadow the question of the Bangalee Muslim identity. This allowed many disenfranchised groups to politicise Islam. The riots in 1950 disrupted the unity among the subalterns, who included lower-caste Hindus and Muslims in 1947. When a nationalist notion subsumed the religious category in 1971, it further troubled the coexistence of Hindus and Muslims. Mahfuj sees the 2024 mass uprising as a redress for many of these unresolved issues, both cultural and ideological. To ensure equity and dignity for all, including the religious and ethnic minorities, the ongoing reformation must address these surface and deep structures.
Mahfuj reflects on the systemic oppression or regression that has created a societal rift. The superimposition of a narrative that privileges one group's ideology over the other has created deep-seated anxiety and internal bleeding. The urgent need is to establish a space for dialogue. I admire Mahfuj for focusing on the rights of a citizen in a democratic country rather than pursuing theocracy, which will subsume the nation's role under a larger caliphate or brotherhood. The idea of plurality and inclusivity needs to be elaborated in our national curricula. The clarity of Mahfuj's understanding may hit a blind wall for those who see it in plain religious terms. We need much more investment in education to ensure that stakeholders are not necessarily driven by passion but by logic and an understanding of the diverse beliefs that make up our society.
Dr Shamsad Mortuza is professor of English at Dhaka University.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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