From 1969 to 2024: Echoes of resistance through the ages
Mass uprisings played a significant role in Bangladesh's history. For instance, during the Language Movement of 1952, a situation akin to a mass uprising arose, leading to the formal recognition of Bangla, although, in reality, that spirit has yet to be fully embraced even today. However, the movement, which went on to claim several lives, marked a major turning point in our history.
The next major mass uprising occurred in 1969, leading to the fall of Ayub Khan, the military general of Pakistan. That event significantly advanced Bangladesh's path to the Liberation War. Then came the mass uprising of 1990, which ended the autocratic regime of Ershad. And after that, the mass uprising of 2024 overthrew the authoritarian Sheikh Hasina government.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. This means that political mobilisation of people against injustice, oppression, or authoritarianism often manifested in mass uprisings in Bangladesh's history, taking the form of a cultural and political language of resistance. However, mass uprisings are not always national in scope. Sometimes, they occur locally. For example, in 2006, the Phulbari incident saw a localised mass uprising, forcing a multinational corporation to withdraw from the area and compelling the government to sign an agreement with the people. There is no precedent for such an incident where a multinational company was forced to leave a region and the government was compelled to negotiate directly with its people. This only happened because of the mass uprising.
At the national level, when comparing the mass uprisings of 1969, 1990, and 2024, several similarities emerge, although critical differences exist among these events. Let us analyse the differences between the mass uprisings of 1969 and 2024.
We can see some parallels between the events of the 1969 uprising—which reached its peak on January 20 of that year—and those of 2024. The 1969 uprising was directed against a military general who had established a powerful autocratic regime and was globally recognised as an "Iron Man." In 2024, we witnessed the fall of another autocrat widely known as the "Iron Lady." Another commonality is that both uprisings occurred at the end of a perceived period of development. During Ayub Khan's era, significant development was showcased, with 1969 marking the celebration of the "Decade of Development" that ostensibly began in 1958. Major infrastructure projects were undertaken, such as the construction of Islamabad as Pakistan's new capital, the building of dams, the expansion of rural and district roads, etc.
During this period, political protests and resistance in East Pakistan led to the Pakistani government designating Dhaka as the second capital. This resulted in significant infrastructural development in Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, including the National Parliament building designed by Louis Kahn. The Bangladesh Agricultural University and Jahangirnagar University were also established, and land reforms were introduced—all part of the "Decade of Development" narrative.
Similarly, under Sheikh Hasina's government, we saw the implementation of significant infrastructure projects such as the Padma Bridge, highways and expressways, and coal-based power plants. However, this infrastructure development was often uncoordinated, overpriced, and riddled with inefficiencies. Many projects became a burden on the economy and a threat to the environment. Alongside such development initiatives, Hasina's tenure witnessed a sharp rise in inequality and widespread corruption, which became focal points of public dissatisfaction.
In the 1960s, inequalities were regional and class-based. East Pakistan, despite being a major contributor to the country's export earnings, received far less development expenditure compared to West Pakistan. Additionally, Bangalees were marginalised in the bureaucracy, military, and other key sectors. These systemic injustices and humiliations fuelled political resistance and protests in East Pakistan.
By contrast, during Hasina's regime, while inequality was not regional, class-based disparities worsened significantly. The suppression of dissent by law enforcement agencies including the police, RAB, and BGB became rampant, along with widespread extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, and abductions. Furthermore, the ruling party's student and youth wings, such as the Chhatra League and Jubo League, were notorious for their acts of violence and oppression—much deadlier than the student mercenaries of the Ayub regime.
The protests of 1969 reached a turning point with the killing of student leader Asaduzzaman on January 20. A political activist affiliated with Maulana Bhashani's NAP and the underground communist movements of that time, Asad was shot dead while leading a procession. He became a symbol of the mass uprising, bolstering people's resolve and inspiring cultural expressions, including Shamsur Rahman's famous poem Asader Shirt.
Similarly, in 2024, the death of Abu Sayeed marked a turning point. On July 16, Abu Sayeed was shot dead during a peaceful protest at Begum Rokeya University. His death sparked widespread outrage, with cultural and artistic responses emerging in the form of sketches, graffiti, poems, and songs. This parallels the cultural impact of Asad's death, showing how the deaths of individuals at critical points can galvanise a movement.
A major difference between the 1969 and 2024 uprisings, however, lies in the political leadership that backed the movements. The 1969 movement was buttressed by organised political forces and their demands, such as Awami League's Six-Point Movement, Maulana Bhashani's Fourteen-Point Programme, and the Eleven-Point demand of the Sarbadaliya Chhatro Sangram Parishad. There was a centralised leadership, involving known political figures such as Maulana Bhashani, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Moni Singh and student leaders affiliated with the movement.
In contrast, the leadership of the 2024 movement was decentralised; the protests were largely driven by the collective anger of ordinary people rather than any coordinated political strategy. While activists from left and right-wing political groups participated in the uprising, no specific political party took on a leading role. This lack of structured leadership has left the outcome of the 2024 uprising uncertain, in contrast to the clear trajectory of the 1969 uprising, which eventually led to the Liberation War in 1971.
These uprisings, however, demonstrate commonalities in their resistance to authoritarianism, a legacy of infrastructural development concealing inequalities, and the symbolic impact of individual sacrifices. However, the differences in political leadership and clarity of goals between the two movements highlight the unique challenges of the 2024 uprising. Though it emerged from a decentralised, spontaneous rejection of authoritarian rule, it lacks a clear roadmap for the future. It has its strength as a grassroots movement but is vulnerable in terms of long-term direction.
Anu Muhammad is a former professor of economics from Jahangirnagar University.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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