Dealing with Myanmar's civil war requires delicate deliberation
The resistance against the military junta in Myanmar is decades old. But it took a new turn when the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) banded together under the banner of Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA). Four years after the 3BHA was established, Myanmar witnessed "Operation 1027," a renewed armed resistance launched by almost 50,000 people. The name indicates the date—October 27—on which the 3BHA commenced armed attacks in various regions. It began with the MNDAA retaking its stronghold township, Laukkaing, located in the northern Shan state which is partially bordered by China, offering an attractive trade route. There is another armed alliance called the People's Defence Force (PDF), formed in 2021 by pro-democracy activists and the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile. A group of ousted members of parliament formed the NUG, represented by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, various minor parties, and ethnic insurgent groups.
China made its first move to establish ties with the three armed ethnic organisations (EAOs) in 2016 when the latter jointly attacked Mongkoe, a township located in northern Shan state. The groups thanked China for its assistance in sheltering civilians crossing the borders. China also convinced Myanmar's military to let these groups attend the second and third sessions of the Union Peace Conference. Again, more recently, China pressed for and mediated talks between the three EAOs and the military junta. It took all these initiatives to protect its national interest, like the oil and gas pipeline projects in the areas where the armed resistance groups had been making their headway. The latest was clamping down on transnational cyber scams and traffickers targeting Chinese citizens. Operation 1027 helped China's efforts to tackle these and get rid of these transnational crimes.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel. Whatever we seek to do, we must realise that we are in a catch-22 situation, given the political and territorial uncertainty in Myanmar. We should remain neutral in responding to the civil war and adopt an approach that does not put us on bad terms either with the central government or the Arakan Army.
More importantly, the 3BHA responded to the growing ties with China by adopting a joint declaration just two months before Operation 1027. They pledged that they would protect Chinese investments and act against those attempting to harm international investments. The Chinese project covers almost 800 kilometres and includes twin pipelines stretching from Kyaukpyu port in Rakhine state through Magway and Mandalay regions and eventually to the northern borders of Shan before reaching China. India, another neighbouring country and a regional rival of China, has also invested in the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project in Rakhine state and the Trilateral Highway Project, which passes through several states to connect its northeast region with Myanmar and Thailand.
The MNDAA and TNLA have established their control in northern Shan state, and the Arakan Army has control in Rakhine state. The AA renewed its fighting against the Myanmar army on November 13, 2023, bringing an end to its year-long unofficial ceasefire. According to a recent news report, the AA has captured five towns out of 16 in Rakhine state and one in its neighbouring Chin state. Rakhine and Chin states share borders with Bangladesh and India.
The brunt of this civil war is being felt at Bangladesh's borders. In Ghumdum union of Bandarban, the district that borders Rakhine, two individuals were killed by stray mortar shells coming in from Myanmar. Media reports show that at least 330 members of Myanmar army and border police have entered Bangladesh, fleeing the conflict, in recent weeks. The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), which even aligned with the AA for a while, seems to have taken a turn as some RSO members are entering Bangladesh as well.
We find ourselves in a unique situation, facing several unforeseen challenges. The first challenge involves the risks of both China and India's economic interests and investments in Rakhine state, and their response to AA's military advancement there. China has proven to be crafty in establishing its ties with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and is diplomatically one step ahead compared to India. It indirectly signals that Bangladeshi foreign policy makers will be in a catch-22 regarding the strategic and economic interests of China and India in dealing with the AA and the military junta in Myanmar. Against such a backdrop, a calculated and rational response from policymakers to the growing control of AA over Rakhine is pivotal, in the sense that we must repatriate all Rohingya refugees and also the military personnel currently taking shelter in Bangladesh, since the future of the military junta in Myanmar is vehemently uncertain.
The second challenge emerges from the uncertainty over the territorial integrity of Myanmar. The NUG in exile, recognised by the European Union, has a plan to create a democratic federal union after the removal of the junta from power. The long history of ethnic conflicts in Myanmar does not support this plan. The unity that we are currently witnessing is not guaranteed, given the politics of populism, ethno-nationalism, and the rise of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar. The relationship between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine is currently hostile. For the same reason, the Muslim community has traditionally distrusted the Arakan Army, which predominantly represents Buddhists, and vice versa. The good news is that the head of the AA, in an interview with a Bangladeshi news outlet, has assured that the Rohingyas will face no problem going back. They will not be discriminated against for their religious identity as they are also citizens of Myanmar. The other possibility is that Myanmar might experience Balkanisation or fragmentation, with the military government becoming administratively weaker. In such a scenario, it will be a dilemma for Bangladesh to choose whom to speak to and negotiate with regarding Rohingya repatriation.
The third challenge is concerning what approach to follow in sending back the Myanmar troops. Whatever we seek to do, we must realise that we are in a catch-22 situation, given the political and territorial uncertainty in Myanmar. We should remain neutral in responding to the civil war and adopt an approach that does not put us on bad terms either with the central government or the Arakan Army. For instance, if we abide by the international humanitarian laws adopted in the Hague and Geneva conventions, it will be a safe approach. These conventions help us legally navigate the situation without antagonising Myanmar's central government or the Arakan Army. Articles 11 and 12 of the Hague Convention and Article 4 of the Geneva Convention provide that the host country can treat soldiers or belligerents crossing into a country to escape wars as military interns. These conventions do not contain a detailed description of the issue, but they suggest two solutions. The soldiers or belligerents can be considered refugees or military interns. If we consider them refugees, the role of the UNHCR comes into play. If we accept them as military interns, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) becomes relevant. The Geneva Convention contains a clause that suggests that the host country can engage the ICRC in such a situation for collecting information, communicating with their families, and sending them back.
Whatever happens to Myanmar, and no matter what steps we take, we need to be delicate and sensible, giving immediate priority to the Rohingya repatriation issue while also dealing with the Myanmar security force and border police personnel entering Bangladesh. We must not compromise our national interests in responding to the civil war in Myanmar. And to ensure this, the best way is to remain neutral and take guidance from international humanitarian laws.
As told to Monorom Polok of The Daily Star.
Dr Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan is professor at the Department of International Relations in Dhaka University.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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