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Why constitutional reform is essential

File Visual: Anwar Sohel

The dream of building a nation rooted in equality, human dignity, and social justice has been a cornerstone of Bangladesh's formation. However, over the past 15 years, this very nation has witnessed a stark departure from those ideals, succumbing to the grip of fascism. Democratic institutions have been systematically dismantled, paving the way for authoritarian rule. Fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms have been trampled, and the aspirations that once drove the people to fight for independence have been replaced by dynastic and repressive systems.

The constitution is, in essence, the "manual" for governing a state. Yet, the present Bangladesh Constitution contains elements that neither reflect the spirit of the country's Liberation War nor safeguard against the rise of fascism. It has, instead, facilitated the authoritarianism of the previous regime in power. While there may be differences of opinion on whether to amend or entirely rewrite the constitution, there is little disagreement that the existing one poses significant obstacles to any future democratic process.

At first glance, one might believe that Bangladesh Constitution upholds the spirit of its independence. However, the principles of equality, human dignity, and social justice enshrined in the declaration of independence have been compromised. This constitution has enabled unchecked power to concentrate in the hands of the prime minister. Through successive amendments, the constitution has primarily centralised authority, serving the interests of those in power.

The constitution's core principles are meant to guide the governance of the state. But what should those principles be? They must be value-based, not ideologically driven. Ideological frameworks inevitably lead to conflict, as society is made up of diverse beliefs. One person might support an Islamic system of governance, while another advocate for secularism. One individual may be a proponent of Bengali nationalism, while another subscribes to Bangladeshi nationalism. If the constitution aligns with any single ideology, it inherently dismisses and alienates those with differing views, posing a serious barrier to building an inclusive society.

What, then, should the foundation of the constitution be? It should rest solely on democracy and the values of equality, human dignity, and social justice, as proclaimed in the declaration of independence. Beyond this, no other ideology—whether socialism, nationalism (Bengali or Bangladeshi), secularism, or religious beliefs—should serve as the guiding principle of the constitution. These ideologies do not align with the needs of a modern state.

The past 50 years of governance under various regimes have shown that ideological frameworks have brought Bangladesh no lasting benefit, instead deepening divisions. The constitution must not embrace any ideology that sparks opposition from any part of society. Its focus should remain on the rules and regulations that govern the state's operations. The state itself should be devoid of any ideological affiliation. Its sole aim is to serve the people and ensure their security through a system of accountable governance. When any ideology—especially one linked to the two dominant political forces of the past 50 years, Awami League and BNP—becomes the basis for governance, the nation is pushed towards conflict. Embracing such an ideological basis means returning to the divisive politics that have already fractured the country.

The four ideological principles enshrined in the current Bangladesh Constitution are essentially the core tenets of a political party, often referred to as "Mujibism." This ideological basis was included without a broader national consensus, reflecting the dominance of one political group's agenda over the people's collective will. The post-independence constitution was drafted by members of the constituent assembly, who had been elected for Pakistan's legislative body, not to create an independent nation. Following a nine-month independence war, the hopes and aspirations of the people had evolved. Given this transformation, it would have been appropriate to form a new constituent assembly through elections, with the mandate to draft the constitution and submit its guiding principles for a public referendum. However, instead of taking such inclusive measures, one party's ideology was imposed as the national ideology through the constitution.

The second critical issue lies in the relationship between the state and religion. A state should not endorse any particular religion; it must belong to all its citizens, regardless of faith. The state's primary role is to ensure equal rights and dignity for all religious groups and people. The constitution must, therefore, be secular in the truest sense, reflecting a commitment to equal treatment for all. However, the current constitution retains elements linking the state to political ideologies and religious identities, leading to an inherent contradiction.

One of the most glaring problems with the constitution is that it concentrates enormous power in the hands of the prime minister. The officeholder simultaneously holds four crucial positions: prime minister, head of the ruling party, leader of the parliamentary party, and leader of the parliament itself. While the president is technically the highest-ranking official in the state, the constitution subordinates the president to the prime minister. The president must act on the advice of the prime minister, rendering the role largely ceremonial and devoid of real power. This has led to the repeated election of presidents who are seen as loyal to the prime minister rather than independent figures who can serve as a check on executive power.

The prime minister's unchecked authority extends across the government, from the formation of the cabinet to appointments in key constitutional posts. Without the prime minister's approval, no one can be appointed to a significant constitutional position. This consolidation of power has transformed the prime minister into a de facto autocrat, particularly in a parliamentary system where the government (executive branch) is formed from the majority party in parliament. Given the additional powers granted to the prime minister by the constitution, the position has taken on the characteristics of a dictatorship.

Moreover, the current constitution has effectively transferred the same authority and power that a president would hold in a presidential system to the prime minister without the necessary mechanisms for accountability. Since the ruling party typically holds a majority in parliament, it becomes nearly impossible for parliament to hold the prime minister accountable. Instead of serving as a body that scrutinises the executive's actions, the parliament has become a rubber stamp that merely approves executive decisions and the government's agenda.

One of the most contentious elements of our constitution is Article 70, which severely restricts the ability of members of parliament (MP) to vote against their party. No MP is permitted to vote against their party's decisions, including decisions made by the government if their party is in power. If an MP dares to defy this rule, they risk losing their parliamentary seat. Rather than representing the interests of their constituents, this provision forces MPs to toe the party line and reduce them to voicing the will of the party leadership, eliminating any possibility of dissent or debate within the legislative body.

The implications of Article 70 are far-reaching, particularly when the head of the party, the parliamentary leader, and the prime minister are all the same person. This concentration of authority leads to a situation where both the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by a single individual.

In light of this, it becomes evident that the current constitution contains all the necessary ingredients for a prime minister to evolve into an authoritarian ruler. With no constitutional provision limiting how many times a person can hold the office of prime minister, the same individual can remain in power indefinitely. This creates a cycle in which power is concentrated in the hands of a single person, with no meaningful checks from either parliament or the judiciary. The concentration of power, absence of genuine accountability, and the intertwining of state and party ideology have all contributed to a deeply flawed system of governance.

The only way to address these critical flaws is through substantial reform of the constitution or even a complete rewriting of it. Without meaningful reforms to the constitution—especially those that restore the balance of power and ensure true accountability—Bangladesh risks continuing down the path of authoritarian rule, with its democratic institutions weakened and its people further marginalised.

To ensure a balanced, inclusive, and accountable system of governance, several key issues must be addressed:

1. Term limits for the prime minister: A constitutional provision should be introduced to prevent any individual from serving more than two terms as prime minister. In addition, the selection process for the prime minister could be modified to resemble that of the president, with an indirect election by members of parliament, ensuring a more democratic and less autocratic process.

2. Separation of key leadership roles: The constitution must ensure that the positions of party leader, head of the executive (prime minister), leader of the parliamentary party, and leader of parliament are never held by the same individual. This separation is crucial to avoid the dangerous concentration of power in a single person, which undermines both democracy and accountability.

3. Abolition of Article 70: Article 70 infringes on the independence of MPs and contradicts the spirit of parliamentary democracy, as it eliminates the possibility of meaningful debate and dissent within parliament and prevents MPs from voting against their party. Its removal is essential for ensuring government accountability through a truly functional legislature.

4. Balancing powers between the prime minister and president: There must be a redistribution of power between the prime minister and the president to prevent an excessive concentration of authority in the hands of a single person. Furthermore, the constitution must include mechanisms to ensure "checks and balances" among the three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—so that no single branch can dominate the others unchecked.

5. Framework for transfer of power: A clear and robust framework for peaceful power transfer, including provisions for an interim government (caretaker government), is essential to safeguard free and fair elections. The reintroduction of a caretaker government system, with necessary amendments, should be considered.

6. Bicameral legislature: To reduce the concentration of power within a single political party, a bicameral (two-chamber) legislative system should be established. This would allow for broader representation and promote a more inclusive democratic process, ensuring that different voices are heard and represented in the legislative process.

7. Value-based constitution, not ideology-based: The constitution should be rooted in universal values such as democracy, equality, human dignity, and justice rather than any particular political ideology. Divisive issues should be excluded from the constitution to help prevent further division and conflict in society.

Without substantial reform of the constitution, it is impossible to create a balanced system of governance where power is properly distributed among different branches of the government and the democratic process is safeguarded. A revised constitution must prioritise the establishment of checks and balances, ensure the independence of parliament, and place meaningful limitations on executive power, including term limits for the prime minister. Only then can Bangladesh hope to restore true democratic governance and prevent the rise of authoritarianism.


Sahid Islam is pursuing PhD at the University of Florida.


Views expressed in this article are the author's own.


Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.

Comments

Why constitutional reform is essential

File Visual: Anwar Sohel

The dream of building a nation rooted in equality, human dignity, and social justice has been a cornerstone of Bangladesh's formation. However, over the past 15 years, this very nation has witnessed a stark departure from those ideals, succumbing to the grip of fascism. Democratic institutions have been systematically dismantled, paving the way for authoritarian rule. Fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms have been trampled, and the aspirations that once drove the people to fight for independence have been replaced by dynastic and repressive systems.

The constitution is, in essence, the "manual" for governing a state. Yet, the present Bangladesh Constitution contains elements that neither reflect the spirit of the country's Liberation War nor safeguard against the rise of fascism. It has, instead, facilitated the authoritarianism of the previous regime in power. While there may be differences of opinion on whether to amend or entirely rewrite the constitution, there is little disagreement that the existing one poses significant obstacles to any future democratic process.

At first glance, one might believe that Bangladesh Constitution upholds the spirit of its independence. However, the principles of equality, human dignity, and social justice enshrined in the declaration of independence have been compromised. This constitution has enabled unchecked power to concentrate in the hands of the prime minister. Through successive amendments, the constitution has primarily centralised authority, serving the interests of those in power.

The constitution's core principles are meant to guide the governance of the state. But what should those principles be? They must be value-based, not ideologically driven. Ideological frameworks inevitably lead to conflict, as society is made up of diverse beliefs. One person might support an Islamic system of governance, while another advocate for secularism. One individual may be a proponent of Bengali nationalism, while another subscribes to Bangladeshi nationalism. If the constitution aligns with any single ideology, it inherently dismisses and alienates those with differing views, posing a serious barrier to building an inclusive society.

What, then, should the foundation of the constitution be? It should rest solely on democracy and the values of equality, human dignity, and social justice, as proclaimed in the declaration of independence. Beyond this, no other ideology—whether socialism, nationalism (Bengali or Bangladeshi), secularism, or religious beliefs—should serve as the guiding principle of the constitution. These ideologies do not align with the needs of a modern state.

The past 50 years of governance under various regimes have shown that ideological frameworks have brought Bangladesh no lasting benefit, instead deepening divisions. The constitution must not embrace any ideology that sparks opposition from any part of society. Its focus should remain on the rules and regulations that govern the state's operations. The state itself should be devoid of any ideological affiliation. Its sole aim is to serve the people and ensure their security through a system of accountable governance. When any ideology—especially one linked to the two dominant political forces of the past 50 years, Awami League and BNP—becomes the basis for governance, the nation is pushed towards conflict. Embracing such an ideological basis means returning to the divisive politics that have already fractured the country.

The four ideological principles enshrined in the current Bangladesh Constitution are essentially the core tenets of a political party, often referred to as "Mujibism." This ideological basis was included without a broader national consensus, reflecting the dominance of one political group's agenda over the people's collective will. The post-independence constitution was drafted by members of the constituent assembly, who had been elected for Pakistan's legislative body, not to create an independent nation. Following a nine-month independence war, the hopes and aspirations of the people had evolved. Given this transformation, it would have been appropriate to form a new constituent assembly through elections, with the mandate to draft the constitution and submit its guiding principles for a public referendum. However, instead of taking such inclusive measures, one party's ideology was imposed as the national ideology through the constitution.

The second critical issue lies in the relationship between the state and religion. A state should not endorse any particular religion; it must belong to all its citizens, regardless of faith. The state's primary role is to ensure equal rights and dignity for all religious groups and people. The constitution must, therefore, be secular in the truest sense, reflecting a commitment to equal treatment for all. However, the current constitution retains elements linking the state to political ideologies and religious identities, leading to an inherent contradiction.

One of the most glaring problems with the constitution is that it concentrates enormous power in the hands of the prime minister. The officeholder simultaneously holds four crucial positions: prime minister, head of the ruling party, leader of the parliamentary party, and leader of the parliament itself. While the president is technically the highest-ranking official in the state, the constitution subordinates the president to the prime minister. The president must act on the advice of the prime minister, rendering the role largely ceremonial and devoid of real power. This has led to the repeated election of presidents who are seen as loyal to the prime minister rather than independent figures who can serve as a check on executive power.

The prime minister's unchecked authority extends across the government, from the formation of the cabinet to appointments in key constitutional posts. Without the prime minister's approval, no one can be appointed to a significant constitutional position. This consolidation of power has transformed the prime minister into a de facto autocrat, particularly in a parliamentary system where the government (executive branch) is formed from the majority party in parliament. Given the additional powers granted to the prime minister by the constitution, the position has taken on the characteristics of a dictatorship.

Moreover, the current constitution has effectively transferred the same authority and power that a president would hold in a presidential system to the prime minister without the necessary mechanisms for accountability. Since the ruling party typically holds a majority in parliament, it becomes nearly impossible for parliament to hold the prime minister accountable. Instead of serving as a body that scrutinises the executive's actions, the parliament has become a rubber stamp that merely approves executive decisions and the government's agenda.

One of the most contentious elements of our constitution is Article 70, which severely restricts the ability of members of parliament (MP) to vote against their party. No MP is permitted to vote against their party's decisions, including decisions made by the government if their party is in power. If an MP dares to defy this rule, they risk losing their parliamentary seat. Rather than representing the interests of their constituents, this provision forces MPs to toe the party line and reduce them to voicing the will of the party leadership, eliminating any possibility of dissent or debate within the legislative body.

The implications of Article 70 are far-reaching, particularly when the head of the party, the parliamentary leader, and the prime minister are all the same person. This concentration of authority leads to a situation where both the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by a single individual.

In light of this, it becomes evident that the current constitution contains all the necessary ingredients for a prime minister to evolve into an authoritarian ruler. With no constitutional provision limiting how many times a person can hold the office of prime minister, the same individual can remain in power indefinitely. This creates a cycle in which power is concentrated in the hands of a single person, with no meaningful checks from either parliament or the judiciary. The concentration of power, absence of genuine accountability, and the intertwining of state and party ideology have all contributed to a deeply flawed system of governance.

The only way to address these critical flaws is through substantial reform of the constitution or even a complete rewriting of it. Without meaningful reforms to the constitution—especially those that restore the balance of power and ensure true accountability—Bangladesh risks continuing down the path of authoritarian rule, with its democratic institutions weakened and its people further marginalised.

To ensure a balanced, inclusive, and accountable system of governance, several key issues must be addressed:

1. Term limits for the prime minister: A constitutional provision should be introduced to prevent any individual from serving more than two terms as prime minister. In addition, the selection process for the prime minister could be modified to resemble that of the president, with an indirect election by members of parliament, ensuring a more democratic and less autocratic process.

2. Separation of key leadership roles: The constitution must ensure that the positions of party leader, head of the executive (prime minister), leader of the parliamentary party, and leader of parliament are never held by the same individual. This separation is crucial to avoid the dangerous concentration of power in a single person, which undermines both democracy and accountability.

3. Abolition of Article 70: Article 70 infringes on the independence of MPs and contradicts the spirit of parliamentary democracy, as it eliminates the possibility of meaningful debate and dissent within parliament and prevents MPs from voting against their party. Its removal is essential for ensuring government accountability through a truly functional legislature.

4. Balancing powers between the prime minister and president: There must be a redistribution of power between the prime minister and the president to prevent an excessive concentration of authority in the hands of a single person. Furthermore, the constitution must include mechanisms to ensure "checks and balances" among the three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—so that no single branch can dominate the others unchecked.

5. Framework for transfer of power: A clear and robust framework for peaceful power transfer, including provisions for an interim government (caretaker government), is essential to safeguard free and fair elections. The reintroduction of a caretaker government system, with necessary amendments, should be considered.

6. Bicameral legislature: To reduce the concentration of power within a single political party, a bicameral (two-chamber) legislative system should be established. This would allow for broader representation and promote a more inclusive democratic process, ensuring that different voices are heard and represented in the legislative process.

7. Value-based constitution, not ideology-based: The constitution should be rooted in universal values such as democracy, equality, human dignity, and justice rather than any particular political ideology. Divisive issues should be excluded from the constitution to help prevent further division and conflict in society.

Without substantial reform of the constitution, it is impossible to create a balanced system of governance where power is properly distributed among different branches of the government and the democratic process is safeguarded. A revised constitution must prioritise the establishment of checks and balances, ensure the independence of parliament, and place meaningful limitations on executive power, including term limits for the prime minister. Only then can Bangladesh hope to restore true democratic governance and prevent the rise of authoritarianism.


Sahid Islam is pursuing PhD at the University of Florida.


Views expressed in this article are the author's own.


Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.

Comments