THE THIRD VIEW
Column by Mahfuz Anam

EVMs, the EC, and waste of public money

Why did the EVM experiment fall on its face?
Cost of electronic voting machines in Bangladesh
Technicians preparing EVMs ahead of the Barishal City Corporation polls in June last year. FILE PHOTO: TITU DAS/STAR

On April 23, we ran a report on how 100,500 electronic voting machines (EVMs), out of 150,000 total, worth Tk 3,825 crore, will soon be gutted as they "are no longer usable," according to an Election Commission official. These machines, with an official lifespan of 10 years, were bought in 2018 just before the election that year, at a cost of Tk 2.35 lakh each—11 times more expensive than the EVMs used in India. As guaranteed, the EVMs purchased by Bangladesh should have functioned at least until 2028.

But the EVMs next door have a different story. Right now, India is holding the biggest election ever in the world with 969 million registered voters. The elections began on April 19 and will be held in seven phases over a six-week period and across more than a million polling stations. The result will be announced on June 4. All of the nearly a billion voters will cast their ballots using the 5.5 million EVMs that are being used throughout this massive country.

So what explains the dramatically opposite trajectories in the use of EVMs between the two neighbouring countries? India, after achieving political consensus on the use of EVMs in 1998 and through many years of trial and error, reached 100 percent use of these machines in 2004 in all its constituencies. But why are we dumping our EVMs into the gutter less than six years after their purchase? By doing so, we are setting back—and we don't know for how long—any possibility of using EVMs in future polls, which is essential for the modernisation of our election process.

Why did the EVM experiment in Bangladesh fall on its face?

There is, of course, the overriding political atmosphere of suspicion and hatred, as well as a culture of never accepting what the other side does. But on the technical side, too, there were fundamental flaws in the EVM project formulation, evaluation, and monitoring that have led to the present disaster.

First, let us delve into the issue of why our EVMs should cost 11 times more than those used in India. It was said that ours were of higher technical capability and had features that others didn't. Voters never came to know what those special features were, but did the Election Commission (EC) know? If yes, did they carry out thorough technical evaluation before approving the machines?

One key feature of the Indian EVM is its paper trail, or the voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). So, when a vote is cast, the machine prints out a slip containing the serial number, name, and symbol of the candidate, which is displayed for seven seconds and then automatically drops into a sealed box. This serves as a confirmation to the voter that the machine has correctly registered his/her vote and also acts as a printed record that can be used to verify voting in case there are questions or contestations. The VVPAT feature greatly helped India to gain public confidence in the EVM process, while its absence did the very opposite in our case. Why didn't our EC insist on having this feature?

Moreover, did the EC do its due diligence before accepting the EVMs, especially as it was costing 11 times higher than the comparable Indian ones?

There is also the question whether the EC did enough to gain public trust in EVM use. The prevailing suspicion that EVMs could be manipulated remains deeply etched in the public mind. The EC should have realised that casting a ballot is a precious right and an exercise of power by each voter, which one would be reluctant to relinquish to a machine unless s/he had full faith on its reliability. But did the EC do enough to gain that crucial public confidence? Why weren't more technical teams, IT specialists, and poll experts utilised to engage with general voters and remove the doubts that continue to gnaw at the public mind as to the dependability of these EVMs? There should have been far more public display regarding the workings of these machines as well as open debate about their capabilities.

Without such outreach to gain public confidence, the EC should not have proceeded to buy so many of these machines. There should have been many more pilot projects with smaller numbers of both voters and EVMs, and through such a process a breakthrough could perhaps have been achieved. If Indian voters could have been won over in favour of the EVMs, why not ours, too, where diversity is so much less?

Perhaps the most damaging and utterly absurd aspect of the EC's project was that there was no provision to store these EVMs when not in use. Can there be anything more ridiculous? When the first batch of 25,000 EVMs were delivered in 2018, the question should have immediately occurred to the EC as to where to store them. Without that crucial question being resolved, the EC ordered more of the machines and in the subsequent years—2019 and 2020—the whole lot of 150,000 EVMs were bought. So, to put it bluntly: EVMs were bought at 11 times the price they are next door and then, when not in use, they have literally been thrown into premises—such as schools, colleges and EC upazila offices—that are inadequate to store these technically sophisticated machines. Temperature, dust, and humidity control are the most essential preconditions for EVMs' preservation, and none of this was ensured. All this was done with the full knowledge that these machines would soon become unusable, as they have now become. The crudity of it all boggles the mind.

As a society under law, shouldn't we be able to hold some people responsible for such blatant waste of public money? Is it those who proposed the EVM project, those who evaluated it, or those who approved it? In a sense, all should be responsible. But in fact, nobody is. The way our administrative procedures are formulated prevents clearly identifying who should be held responsible in case of failure. This, coupled with the practice of never holding anyone responsible, has created a culture of spending public money without any regard for accountability. Every year, the media runs hundreds of stories about waste of public money but no accountability comes out of it. The office of the Comptroller and Auditor General publishes hundreds of well-researched reports annually, exposing cases of public money being squandered. But these reports ultimately gather dust. The fact that no official has ever been held responsible or punished—especially the senior ones—has created an environment of endorsing corruption. This also feeds into the present culture of impunity among the rich and powerful.

Shouldn't the EC hold its own investigation as to how the EVM disaster occurred, and what can be done to prevent such a failure in the future. With nearly a billion voters, India has achieved 100 percent usage of EVMs and we, with only 120 million voters, are abandoning it, with all the implications of continuing the controversies of ballot stuffing, midnight voting and the rest. The fiasco with the EVMs has created further doubt in the public mind as to the capabilities of our EC to hold free and fair elections in the near future.


Mahfuz Anam is editor and publisher of The Daily Star.


Views expressed in this article are the author's own.


Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.

Comments

Column by Mahfuz Anam

EVMs, the EC, and waste of public money

Why did the EVM experiment fall on its face?
Cost of electronic voting machines in Bangladesh
Technicians preparing EVMs ahead of the Barishal City Corporation polls in June last year. FILE PHOTO: TITU DAS/STAR

On April 23, we ran a report on how 100,500 electronic voting machines (EVMs), out of 150,000 total, worth Tk 3,825 crore, will soon be gutted as they "are no longer usable," according to an Election Commission official. These machines, with an official lifespan of 10 years, were bought in 2018 just before the election that year, at a cost of Tk 2.35 lakh each—11 times more expensive than the EVMs used in India. As guaranteed, the EVMs purchased by Bangladesh should have functioned at least until 2028.

But the EVMs next door have a different story. Right now, India is holding the biggest election ever in the world with 969 million registered voters. The elections began on April 19 and will be held in seven phases over a six-week period and across more than a million polling stations. The result will be announced on June 4. All of the nearly a billion voters will cast their ballots using the 5.5 million EVMs that are being used throughout this massive country.

So what explains the dramatically opposite trajectories in the use of EVMs between the two neighbouring countries? India, after achieving political consensus on the use of EVMs in 1998 and through many years of trial and error, reached 100 percent use of these machines in 2004 in all its constituencies. But why are we dumping our EVMs into the gutter less than six years after their purchase? By doing so, we are setting back—and we don't know for how long—any possibility of using EVMs in future polls, which is essential for the modernisation of our election process.

Why did the EVM experiment in Bangladesh fall on its face?

There is, of course, the overriding political atmosphere of suspicion and hatred, as well as a culture of never accepting what the other side does. But on the technical side, too, there were fundamental flaws in the EVM project formulation, evaluation, and monitoring that have led to the present disaster.

First, let us delve into the issue of why our EVMs should cost 11 times more than those used in India. It was said that ours were of higher technical capability and had features that others didn't. Voters never came to know what those special features were, but did the Election Commission (EC) know? If yes, did they carry out thorough technical evaluation before approving the machines?

One key feature of the Indian EVM is its paper trail, or the voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). So, when a vote is cast, the machine prints out a slip containing the serial number, name, and symbol of the candidate, which is displayed for seven seconds and then automatically drops into a sealed box. This serves as a confirmation to the voter that the machine has correctly registered his/her vote and also acts as a printed record that can be used to verify voting in case there are questions or contestations. The VVPAT feature greatly helped India to gain public confidence in the EVM process, while its absence did the very opposite in our case. Why didn't our EC insist on having this feature?

Moreover, did the EC do its due diligence before accepting the EVMs, especially as it was costing 11 times higher than the comparable Indian ones?

There is also the question whether the EC did enough to gain public trust in EVM use. The prevailing suspicion that EVMs could be manipulated remains deeply etched in the public mind. The EC should have realised that casting a ballot is a precious right and an exercise of power by each voter, which one would be reluctant to relinquish to a machine unless s/he had full faith on its reliability. But did the EC do enough to gain that crucial public confidence? Why weren't more technical teams, IT specialists, and poll experts utilised to engage with general voters and remove the doubts that continue to gnaw at the public mind as to the dependability of these EVMs? There should have been far more public display regarding the workings of these machines as well as open debate about their capabilities.

Without such outreach to gain public confidence, the EC should not have proceeded to buy so many of these machines. There should have been many more pilot projects with smaller numbers of both voters and EVMs, and through such a process a breakthrough could perhaps have been achieved. If Indian voters could have been won over in favour of the EVMs, why not ours, too, where diversity is so much less?

Perhaps the most damaging and utterly absurd aspect of the EC's project was that there was no provision to store these EVMs when not in use. Can there be anything more ridiculous? When the first batch of 25,000 EVMs were delivered in 2018, the question should have immediately occurred to the EC as to where to store them. Without that crucial question being resolved, the EC ordered more of the machines and in the subsequent years—2019 and 2020—the whole lot of 150,000 EVMs were bought. So, to put it bluntly: EVMs were bought at 11 times the price they are next door and then, when not in use, they have literally been thrown into premises—such as schools, colleges and EC upazila offices—that are inadequate to store these technically sophisticated machines. Temperature, dust, and humidity control are the most essential preconditions for EVMs' preservation, and none of this was ensured. All this was done with the full knowledge that these machines would soon become unusable, as they have now become. The crudity of it all boggles the mind.

As a society under law, shouldn't we be able to hold some people responsible for such blatant waste of public money? Is it those who proposed the EVM project, those who evaluated it, or those who approved it? In a sense, all should be responsible. But in fact, nobody is. The way our administrative procedures are formulated prevents clearly identifying who should be held responsible in case of failure. This, coupled with the practice of never holding anyone responsible, has created a culture of spending public money without any regard for accountability. Every year, the media runs hundreds of stories about waste of public money but no accountability comes out of it. The office of the Comptroller and Auditor General publishes hundreds of well-researched reports annually, exposing cases of public money being squandered. But these reports ultimately gather dust. The fact that no official has ever been held responsible or punished—especially the senior ones—has created an environment of endorsing corruption. This also feeds into the present culture of impunity among the rich and powerful.

Shouldn't the EC hold its own investigation as to how the EVM disaster occurred, and what can be done to prevent such a failure in the future. With nearly a billion voters, India has achieved 100 percent usage of EVMs and we, with only 120 million voters, are abandoning it, with all the implications of continuing the controversies of ballot stuffing, midnight voting and the rest. The fiasco with the EVMs has created further doubt in the public mind as to the capabilities of our EC to hold free and fair elections in the near future.


Mahfuz Anam is editor and publisher of The Daily Star.


Views expressed in this article are the author's own.


Follow The Daily Star Opinion on Facebook for the latest opinions, commentaries and analyses by experts and professionals. To contribute your article or letter to The Daily Star Opinion, see our guidelines for submission.

Comments